# DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP

## NOTES

This counterplan should be treated as a “PIC” out of DoD **administration** and **funding** of security cooperation. Activities very similar to “security cooperation” can be accomplished between the US and NATO under the moniker “security assistance.”

The two primary net-benefits, thus far, are:

1-DoD funding/resources tradeoff DA. The DoD tradeoff DA is very simple: the plan requires drawing significant resources from the DoD, the counterplan doesn’t

2-Diplomatic Credibility internal net-benefit. The Diplomatic Credibility Good net-benefit is more complicated. It argues that the counterplan re-centers the State Department, instead of the military, as the leader of US foreign assistance, which promotes the ability of diplomats, as opposed to servicepeople, to achieve their desired outcomes. That’s good because diplomacy should lead the charge for solving transnational existential threats. Like most internal net-benefits, there are flaws: the counterplan’s single action is likely insufficient to boost credibility, the military and state department can both lead together and the State Department might not be the ideal department to lead challenges in, and out, of NATO.

There are a variety of other net-benefits that will come out in wave 2:

--DoD assistance causes Russian aggression, DoS assistance doesn’t

--DoD assistance precludes effective Congressional oversight, DoS assistance doesn’t

--DoD assistance condones human rights violations, DoS assistance doesn’t

Although I have a start on some of those positions, I chose to exclude them in order to streamline this file as much as possible.

There are two (related) concerns that I want to note. They should be in the back of your mind as you are prepping the file, and should be noted when refuting the argument.

1—I am uncertain that, by September, you will want to think of this as the “security assistance” counterplan. Although the negative competition evidence is pretty good (Kerr is by far the best), there is also very good evidence that describes security cooperation as a subset of security assistance – making the CP plan-plus, and/or link to the disadvantages. Also, “security assistance” is often referencing security sector assistance, which is more about building domestic resilience than establishing war-fighting abilities (depending on the aff, that might be a feature not a bug). There are certainly other ways to write the counterplan text. After seeing debates in the first week of camp, the second version of the file might look a lot different.

2—I am uncertain if it’s best to think of this CP as a PIC out of the DoD entirely, or a PIC out of DoD administration (still allowing for DoD involvement). This might seem like a semantic distinction, but it matters quite a bit for the way that net-benefits and solvency operate. For example, if the counterplan entirely excludes the DoD, it will likely be a bit less solvent on mostly military matters (like LAWS). If the counterplan includes the DoD, but does not have them fund or administer the cooperation, then the counterplan likely solves a bit better but has a more limited range of net-benefits. The current version of the file certainly allows the neg to say the military is significantly involved in the counterplan, just that the specific initiative would be administered, and funded, by the State Department. DoS can sell military articles, interact with foreign militaries, and even have service-members on staff, which is important to remember when debating the solvency of the counterplan.

When prepping the file, I would start by doing the following:

---Read it. Don’t highlight it the first time, see what’s there. If you don’t know what’s there, or what you need to refute, you won’t know what to highlight anyway.

---Read every plan, solvency advocate and “military key” card in each of the affirmatives produced

---Write a 1nc shell that’s specific to each of those affirmatives, and a 2nc block responding to each aff’s “military key” claims. Make the decision: internal net-benefit, or not?

---Then, start to highlight the file --- specifically highlighting the parts of evidence that helps with each strategy.

If anyone has questions, feel free to email me at brickerb@umich.edu

## 1NC

### 1NC [No Internal Net-Benefit]

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

#### The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” *Connections*, 17.3)//BB

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### Department of State assistance solves best

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)//BB

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

### 1NC [With Internal Net-Benefit]

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

#### The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” *Connections*, 17.3)//BB

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### Department of State assistance solves best AND revitalizes US diplomacy

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)//BB

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

#### Enhanced diplomatic credibility solves every transnational risk

Burns 20, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The Indispensable Power,” *Harvard Magazine*, https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2020/07/features-forum-indispensable-power)//BB

DIPLOMACY has never been so important as now, when we are confronting the most serious crises since the Second World War: the global pandemic and economic collapse. When we emerge finally from the grip of the coronavirus, Americans will need to account for a public-health disaster that has killed well over 100,000 people to date and shuttered nearly every institution in our society (including Harvard) for much of the spring and into the summer. But we’ll also need to look beyond our borders to assess what went wrong globally. Why did the World Health Organization—its long and continuing record of expertise in matters of global health notwithstanding—not press China more aggressively to tell the truth about the virus in early January? How should nations be better prepared for a possible second wave? Can they agree to share a vaccine equitably among the world’s 7.7 billion people? Will the major economies collaborate to prevent the current recession from turning into another Great Depression? The answer to these questions will depend in large measure on our ability to work diplomatically across the world in this multi-front struggle. As a former career Foreign Service officer, I have spent four decades of my professional life representing the United States overseas and teaching about America’s role as the indispensable power in the international arena. For much of that time, the nation leaned heavily on its unmatched military might—during the Cold War, after 9/11, and in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Now, with the spread of the coronavirus to every inhabited continent, diplomacy’s time has come in the reconstruction of a more stable and better world. Unfortunately, restoring the role of U.S. diplomacy won’t be easy. One early casualty of the pandemic is our plummeting credibility as the unmatched global power. For the first time since World War II, America has chosen not to lead in confronting a quintessentially global threat. With American energy and confidence in short supply, President Donald Trump is a spectral figure on the world stage as nations struggle to contain the virus. Instead of leading the G-20 major economies against the contagion, the world has watched an American president castigate China for birthing the “Wuhan Virus,” pin the blame for the failed response on the World Health Organization, and—as one of my European students lamented—fail even to offer a simple word of sympathy in all those endless news conferences to those dying in Italy and Spain and other bedrock allies. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has long maintained that America should place its diplomats out in front (“on point” in the military vernacular), with the armed forces in reserve, to be used only when diplomacy fails. Powell’s dictum is an important reminder of how the United States should seek to lead in this time of pandemic, for the coronavirus is only one of many among a new type of threat that requires us to lead as much through the power of diplomacy as through that of the military. Many of the students I teach point to transnational threats that affect every nation and person on earth as our greatest challenges: climate change, food and water shortages, narcotics and crime cartels, the lack of cyber security, and pandemics top the list. We cannot succeed in containing them without forming diplomatic alliances among governments, universities, foundations, businesses, and citizens. This new brand of diplomacy is not an alternative to the military but its logical partner in the twenty-first century American arsenal. The military remains essential to fight terrorists, and to counter rivals Russia and China and outlaw governments in North Korea and Iran, but even in these cases we have to have robust diplomacy to achieve our aims. Even if we deployed the full might of the U.S. military to eliminate the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and the regimes that support them, does anyone believe that would, by itself, “solve” the problem? Even in those cases, deft, multilateral diplomacy will have to play a lead role—as recent experience has shown. We can no longer default to force alone, as we have done so often since 9/11. A Foreign Service for 2030 AMERICA’S DIPLOMATIC EFFECTIVENESS rests, in large part, on the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service—more than 11,000 career officials in more than 280 embassies and consulates and at the State Department in Washington, D.C. They are our primary interface with foreign governments, businesses, and citizens. They adjudicate immigrant and non-immigrant visas and refugee admissions to the United States. They help American businesses overcome barriers to foreign trade and investment. They manage difficult war and peace challenges in every corner of the world—from daily challenges to the most intricate, strategic matters vital to our national security and prosperity. Diplomatic collaboration also underpins our ability to advance the more positive scientific, technological, and societal trends that can sustain the historic alleviation of poverty worldwide, promote women’s rights, and realize the promise of a carbon-free economy. Just when we need to turn to diplomacy, however, the Foreign Service is experiencing one of the greatest crises in its long history. Some of the damage has been caused by prior Democratic as well as Republican administrations. The United States is the only major country that fills a third or more of its ambassadorial assignments with political appointees, often poorly qualified, from outside the career ranks—often depriving the country of the advantages it could secure with expert, professional, nonpartisan diplomatic representation around the world. That mistake has only accelerated, with the current administration appointing the lowest percentage of career ambassadors in more than half a century. Former generals and admirals have been appointed to ambassadorships that would otherwise be filled—as they should be—by civilian officers. The politicization and militarization of our foreign policy by both parties is a genuine problem. More broadly, the Foreign Service has been substantially weakened and is in need of major repair. Even as the Trump administration’s budget requests for the Department of Defense rose from $686 billion to as high as $718 billion during its first two years, it sought to slash the State Department’s budget by up to a third. The administration fired several of America’s most senior and experienced diplomats early in 2017 and sidelined countless others, triggering an exodus of officers of every rank. The president himself has castigated career diplomats as the “Deep State.” Unsurprisingly, morale has crashed and young Americans’ applications for the Foreign Service have fallen to just under 10,000 from a high of 31,000 in 2003—a worrisome indicator that our nation’s ability to attract superb diplomatic talent is being eroded. Re-Imagining American Diplomacy THE KENNEDY SCHOOL launched an ambitious, nonpartisan initiative this winter—A New American Diplomacy for the 21st Century—to address these concerns and spark a national conversation about the future of the Foreign Service. I am working with former Foreign Service colleagues, Ambassadors Nancy McEldowney, Marc Grossman, and Marcie Ries, to issue a major public report after the November presidential election. We have organized online meetings with hundreds of current and former officials, business and nonprofit leaders, and everyday citizens to discuss ways to strengthen the career service. American diplomacy needs a major generational update. Since 9/11, Congress and three administrations have reformed the U.S. military and intelligence services and created the Department of Homeland Security. But collectively, they did little to re-imagine diplomacy’s role in the American arsenal. During the last century, there have been just three efforts to modernize the U.S. diplomatic corps: in 1924, 1946, and 1980 (when Congress passed the last major State Department Authorization Act). In our vastly altered geo-strategic environment, 40 years later, it is time to renew the mission of the Foreign Service. Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Mahmoud Abbas, September 22, 2009, at the Waldorf Astoria, New York City Photograph by John Angelillo-Pool/Getty Images We can mine America’s long diplomatic history for inspiration. Drawing on my own experience, I recall, as a young intern at the U.S. embassy in Mauritania, seeing first-hand the respect and influence President Jimmy Carter earned as the first U.S. leader to make Africa a priority. A decade later, when I served at the National Security Council with responsibility for the Soviet Union, I witnessed President George H.W. Bush negotiate the peaceful end of the Cold War and Bill Clinton consolidate the triumph of democracy over communism. President George W. Bush launched the bipartisan PEPFAR initiative to help in the fight against HIV/AIDs, polio, malaria, and other deadly diseases in Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere (a useful precedent when thinking about what it will really take to combat the coronavirus, not only in the developed nations, but in those with far fewer economic and healthcare resources). It was on 9/11, however, as U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that I learned one of the most powerful lessons about diplomacy. Just a few hours after Al Qaida terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon, my phone started to ring at NATO headquarters outside Brussels. My Canadian colleague, David Wright, called first—followed by the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, and many others. Each asked, “What can we do to help?” Those were very welcome words on the single darkest day in recent American history. By the next morning, invoking Article 5 of the 1949 NATO Treaty for the first time in history, all of the NATO-allied countries came to the rescue of the United States—lending mighty political and diplomatic support to the military response that would come later. Our allies considered Osama Bin Laden’s attacks on New York and Washington as an attack on them as well. Their militaries all went into Afghanistan with us (the majority remain 19 years later—and they and other partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths; we owe them a lot). Contrary to such evidence, the current president believes the United States is strongest when it acts alone—unburdened of allies and partners whom he views as relics of our Cold War past. I lived the history of 9/11 and draw a very different lesson about the value of allies to the United States. Why would we want to live alone in a troubled and dangerous world, without the benefit of friends and allies by our side? Our NATO allies, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, act as multipliers of American power in the world. They provide a lifeline of military, economic, and political support when we often need it most. They represent the great power differential between the United States and our rivals Russia and China, who can count on no such allies when the chips are down. As we recover from two decades of war and COVID-19’s assault on our society and economy, we will need to look at our global role in a new way. The era when America could run the world by fiat has vanished. We are still the strongest economic, military, and technological power—but China, India, and others are gaining on us. We can no longer overpower our adversaries in every crisis. And although we will need to call on the military to defend us in the future, we will more often than not need to outwit and outmaneuver adversaries through the strength of our diplomats and our alliances—not to mention mustering support for those broader, nonmilitary crises we now face, from pandemics to climate change.

## COMPETITION

### AT PDCP---SC vs SA

#### Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)//BB

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

#### Any other interpretation is derived from, and causes, confusion

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)//BB

There is confusion in the lexicon around Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA, security assistance, security cooperation (SC), building partner capacity (BPC), foreign internal defense (FID), defense institution building (DIB), train-and-equip, advise-and-assist, and by-with-andthrough all refer to efforts by one nation to improve the capacity of another nation’s security sector. Within the United States government, these terms are attached to different legal authorities, different funding sources, and different strictures with respect to the agencies— civilian or military—responsible for implementation. The terms refer to an eclectic set of activities, ranging from educational programs like the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), to personnel exchanges, to unit-level training, to unit-level advising, to wholesale efforts to build militaries from scratch. The byzantine nature of security assistance and security cooperation terminology, authorities, agencies, and activities has caused confusion and sparked criticism among the growing community of policymakers and scholars trying to better track it, understand it, and improve it.17 This study uses interchangeably the terms security assistance and Security Force Assistance (SFA), defined by U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”18 SFA technically refers to efforts to build the entire security sector of a partner— including their police, National Guard, and gendarme. This study focuses, however, exclusively on efforts by the United States to build the partner’s military (the largest subset of SFA activities), and excludes analysis of efforts to build non-military security forces.19 SFA, in turn, is the largest subset of SC, which refers to “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.”20

#### The State Department implements Assistance, the Department of Defense implements Security Cooperation

Tankel 20, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, (“RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/>, (accessed 5-21-2022)//BB

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

### AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

#### Security Cooperation requires the DoD to be the source of funding

Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, at the UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined” December, <https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1020&context=thes>)//BB

Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 9 provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.

#### It's strictly limited to DoD actions

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” <http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao_Webinar/Greenbook_39_0.pdf)//BB>

Introduction to Security Cooperation

Introduction

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the then named Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day to day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD) funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. So that other U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector and foreign governments could better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) effective 1 October 1998.

In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs. In addition, DSCA leads the broader USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs) or the military departments (MILDEPs). What further complicated the management of security cooperation was that the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation generally is either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sponsored defense attaché office (DAO) or the DSCA sponsored security cooperation office (SCO). These two spigots for security cooperation with a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD and its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Official-Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations. It was not until 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD administered security assistance programs.

#### The most clear and specific definition conclusively requires the DoD

Reighard 6, Lt Col in USAF (Robert, “SECURITY COOPERATION: INTEGRATING STRATEGIES TO SECURE NATIONAL GOALS,” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA449543.pdf)//BB

Security cooperation has been a part of the U.S. Armed Forces for many years. In fact, historians reveal that the U.S. military has always engaged in security cooperation with other countries and their military forces. However, the term used to designate such activities is now “Security Cooperation,” a term that has evolved conceptually through various programs over the years. During the 1990s, the terms “engagement” and “shaping” were used without sufficient specificity; they were often used interchangeably, resulting in confusion that led to problems in both planning and execution. DOD thus adopted “Security Cooperation” in 2001. It included a broad range of military-to-military activities, but it also clarified roles and responsibilities. The term Security Cooperation thus describes a broad range of activities used by the Department of Defense in peacetime operations. These activities refer to all DOD interactions that are carried out with foreign defense establishments, such as combined exercises, combined training, combined education, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and information operations.

#### Budget classification proves it’s military-to-military

Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)//BB

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

#### Security Cooperation is military-to-military activity

Finkelstein 10, PhD, Vice President of the CNA Corporation, an independent, non-profit research institution in Arlington, Virginia (David, “The Military Dimensions of U.S.-China Security Cooperation: Retrospective and Future Prospects,” *Center for Naval Analyses*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA530755>)//BB

The United States and China have engaged in security cooperation on a variety of international issues since the normalization of relations in 1979. In fact, security cooperation began even before the formal establishment of state-to-state relations. We recall that during the height of the Cold War the two nations demonstrated that when a pressing and shared security concern in that case, the former Soviet Union presented itself, Washington and Beijing were capable of working together, extant differences notwithstanding. Security consultations and sometime security cooperation between the two countries continue today. But as the record of security cooperation is reviewed, one comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, U.S.-China security cooperation has been mainly of a political nature and operationalized at a high level of strategic policy coordination. Security cooperation between the two nations has been largely the purview of U.S. and Chinese civilian officials and diplomats, not generals and admirals. In other words, over the course of 30 years of relations, security cooperation between the defense-military establishments of the United States and China -- the uniformed services -- has been the exception rather than the rule. If a serious discussion about future security cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy is to take place -- a leitmotif of this series of conferences as described by the sponsors -- then some of the issues, challenges, and problems from the past need to be confronted even as we look over the horizon. For the purposes of this paper, security cooperation is defined as the two militaries working together to achieve a common objective -- not high-level visits, exchanges, port calls, or other activities that are mainly symbolic or representational in nature.

#### It’s the DoD

Watts and Biegon 17, \*PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, \*\*associate lecturer and research administrator in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent(Tom and Rubrick, “Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation,” <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ORG_RemoteControl_SecCoop.pdf>)//BB

This briefing paper provides an overview of a central, but often overlooked, instrument of US remote warfare: security cooperation. In the briefing, security cooperation is defined as Department of Defense-managed programmes to train, equip and advise foreign security forces to fight alongside, or as surrogates for, American ‘boots on the ground’. Since the final years of the Bush administration, this feature of remote warfare has emerged as a central instrument in the US counterterrorism toolbox. In comparison to the kinetic face of remote warfare, however, it remains poorly understood. This briefing paper demonstrates the significance of security cooperation to remote warfare. It focuses on the use of security cooperation in US counterterrorism operations during the Obama presidency, with examples drawn from efforts to combat Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab. It concludes by briefly considering the future of security cooperation under the Trump administration.

#### SC is done by the military encouraging and enabling other countries to work with the US

Mariano and O’Brien 9, \*recently served as the Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, \*\*received his M.A. in Security Policy Studies from the George Washington University's Elliott School (Stephen and Charles, “US Army Africa: Smart Power in Action,” Small Wars Journal, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/193-mariano.pdf)//BB

Security cooperation is defined as the means by which the Department of Defense encourages and enables countries to work with the United States. It includes official, cooperative and general non-combat interactions.4 Military organizations conduct security cooperation activities, as part of the range of military operations. These activities are intended to build institutional capacity within partner nation security structures so those nations can become self-sufficient, secure their populations, control their borders and contribute to regional peace. Security cooperation activities are also aimed at developing peacetime interoperability between US and partner forces so that in times of crisis, activities are executed effectively and efficiently. The US also conducts security cooperation to enhance relationships with partner nations and to gain dependable host nation support. Though sometimes misconstrued, routine military cooperation activities can evolve into relationships that help ensure the US can successfully assist regional partners in times of crisis. For example, US ability to position forces, equipment and supplies, or use ports, warehouses and airfields when planning and conducting crisis response operations could save time… and ultimately, lives.

#### Even the broadest definitions requires the DoD

Williams 12, Lt Col in Army National Guard (James, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>)//BB

Similarly, the six Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) have underscored security cooperation and building partner capacity as essential to their respective Theater Strategy Plans and Country Campaign Plans in support of National Security objectives. In every COCOM posture statement the reader will find references 7 to the importance of the concepts of cooperation, engagement, and building partner capacity. “Security Cooperation” is defined broadly as interactions between the Department of Defense and foreign militaries that promote specific United States security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities; and provide the United States with both peacetime and contingency access to host nations.12 Typical security cooperation and engagement activities include military-to-military contact, coalition training, nation assistance and long term operations. These types of activities range from Navy ship port visits to combined training exercises, foreign military education, leader conferences, foreign military sales and counter-drug operations.

#### Security Cooperation requires a military branch to be the implementing agency

Arnold 20, colonel in USAF (Jason, “Add Value to Security Cooperation through Joint Unification,” FAO Journal of International Affairs, <https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/add-value-to-security-cooperation?s=r)//BB>

In the Security Cooperation Enterprise, the military departments loom large as the primary implementing agencies of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases, and in training activities.[6] These SC programs provide our international partners with the capabilities they require both for their own security and to assist in regional security objectives that improve the overall global security situation. Most open SC cases have one of the military departments as an Implementing Agency (IA) and each service has built its own organizational structure, bureaucracy, and automated systems to support the effort.[7]

### AT PDCP---Prefer Our Interp

#### Given that basically any activity is included, the only functional limit on the topic has to come at the agent-level

Mazarr 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the U.S. National War College, where he was professor and associate dean of academics; as president of the Henry L. Stimson Center; senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; senior defense aide on Capitol Hill; and as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Michael, “Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition,” RAND, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA650-1.html>)

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

Such definitions clearly include almost any security-related activity for any purpose. To scope the focus of the study, we reviewed official state documents and strategies and the literature on security cooperation to identify 11 types of activities:

1. military aid, which includes funding through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the Excess Defense Articles program, and other grants and loans

2. arms sales and transfers,4 such as U.S. arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs

3. military capacity-building, such as U.S. activities under Section 1206 of the annual National Defense Authorization Act and Sections and 2282 and 333 of U.S. Code, Title 10 (the train and equip authority)

4. education and training, including international military education and training (IMET), professional military education (PME), and regional centers

5. personnel exchanges, such as U.S. activities under the Military Personnel Exchange Program and the State Partnership Program

6. military exercises, both bilateral and multilateral and those that involve foreign partners

7. access-related agreements, such as status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and agreements related to base access and information-sharing

8. armament-related agreements, such as those for co-development of systems and for research, development, test, and evaluation activities

9. sustainment of donor-nation equipment by the donor, the partner, or third parties

10. institutional capacity–building to strengthen the partner institutions that support security services

11. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), which offers support for efforts to relieve suffering.

These categories offered a consistent template for gathering data across our various study components. A major challenge was that reliable and consistent data on each of the 11 categories were not available for all the competitors—not even for the United States. Especially at the unclassified level, there is simply no comprehensive roster of security cooperation activities by the United States, and neither China nor Russia publishes inclusive data sets of its programs. An additional challenge was that, in some cases, the different countries define the categories somewhat differently, so we could not develop data on entirely comparable sets of security cooperation activities.

### AT PDB---No Solvency

#### The permutation is two simultaneous and overlapping assistance programs. That dooms solvency for both. Duplication causes operational and planning conflicts that cause great power miscalculation

Bergmann 21, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center, 2021 (Max, “It’s time to get the Pentagon out of the business of administering U.S. foreign aid,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/11/its-time-get-pentagon-out-business-administering-us-foreign-aid/>)//BB

The result today is that the United States has two distinct security assistance systems — one at the State Department and one at the Defense Department — doing the same thing. That has created a bureaucratic mess involving countless planning and operational conflicts — one that also makes it impossible for Congress to conduct effective oversight, since the two departments answer to different committees. Recognizing the problem, some policymakers in Congress and the Pentagon have recently implemented a few useful reforms — but they go only so far. Today, when combatant commanders show up in the countries they’re assigned to, they frequently have security assistance funding at their disposal. But State Department officials of similar rank often lack comparably flexible funding and yet have to deliver tough messages on other U.S. foreign policy priorities, from human rights to economic reform, democratization or even climate policy. This power imbalance is not lost on foreign partners, and they act accordingly, often tuning out the State Department while cultivating their relations with the Defense Department. The current bifurcated system is not just wasteful — it’s also potentially dangerous. Policymakers originally expanded Defense Department assistance in response to the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, when security assistance was often seen as a technical tool to smooth collaboration with foreign militaries. But in a new era of global great power competition, the provision of arms to another country sends a loud foreign policy signal, one that can easily lead to miscalculation. Those assistance decisions need to be well coordinated and calibrated by diplomats, not generals.

#### The State Department needs full control of the policy in order to guarantee mission success

Gould 4-22-2022, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry, April 11, 2022 (“For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?,” *Defense News*, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/)//BB>

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said. “What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress. Meanwhile, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle are generally supportive of shifts, arguing for an overhaul of the current setup. “As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we’ve seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on sustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy,” Risch said. “We must address governance challenges like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.”

#### The perm leads to bifurcated and incoherent foreign policy, not coordination

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>)//BB

There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:

The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38

Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

Temporary programs become permanent. The majority of the new DOD security assistance authorities were premised as temporary, operational programs, designed to tackle immediate threats and challenges.47 But in practice, many programs have endured. Once a multiyear, multimillion-dollar program is established, it has a tendency to become entrenched, becoming a permanent assistance program with its own invested bureaucracy to sustain and expand it.48 The Section 1206 authority exemplifies this phenomenon: A 2017 DOD inspector general report found that “DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a ‘program’”—despite the fact that it was annually authorized and funded for 10 years until fiscal year 2015. Some $2.2 billion was appropriated for Section 1206 before it became law. Section 333 funding now replicates many of the same functions today.

The DOD’s duplicative security assistance programs complicate overall foreign policymaking. Reforming security assistance by centralizing resources at the State Department—and coupling the move with necessary reforms at the State Department—would go a long way toward improving this policy process.

### AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

#### The permutation undermines State Department credibility. Collapses liberalism.

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/)//BB>

U.S. military SC [Security Cooperation] efforts may also complicate diplomacy. Generals whisk in on executive jets with large entourages and largesse in the form of SC funds and services. The result is that foreign officials see their military counterparts as congenial and influential partners in contrast to the U.S. ambassador—who comes with little in the way of other aid and is often seen as browbeating and meddling in sovereign affairs—whose role is to try to hold back the tide of illiberalism much to the chagrin of his or her counterparts.

#### Diplomacy has to be the tool of first-resort to restore US diplomatic leadership

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014 (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy)//BB>

Diplomacy may be one of the world’s oldest professions, but it’s also one of the most misunderstood. It’s mostly a quiet endeavor, less swaggering than unrelenting, oftentimes operating in back channels, out of sight and out of mind. U.S. President Donald Trump’s disdain for professional diplomacy and its practitioners—along with his penchant for improvisational flirtations with authoritarian leaders such as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un—has put an unaccustomed spotlight on the profession. It has also underscored the significance of its renewal. The neglect and distortion of American diplomacy is not a purely Trumpian invention. It has been an episodic feature of the United States’ approach to the world since the end of the Cold War. The Trump administration, however, has made the problem infinitely worse. There is never a good time for diplomatic malpractice, but the administration’s unilateral diplomatic disarmament is spectacularly mistimed, unfolding precisely at a moment when American diplomacy matters more than ever to American interests. The United States is no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block, and no longer able get everything it wants on its own, or by force alone. Although the era of singular U.S. dominance on the world stage is over, the United States still has a better hand to play than any of its rivals. The country has a window of opportunity to lock in its role as the world’s pivotal power, the one best placed to shape a changing international landscape before others shape it first. If the United States is to seize that opportunity and safeguard its interests and values, it will have to rebuild American diplomacy and make it the tool of first resort, backed up by economic and military leverage and the power of example.

#### The link is linear. Every funding decision matters.

Ryan 16, writes about diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post. She joined The Post in 2014 to write about the Pentagon and military issues (Missy, “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-and-pentagon-tussle-over-control-of-foreign-military-aid/2016/07/10/ddc98f3e-42b0-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html)//BB>

State Department officials fear that an expansion in Pentagon control over security assistance would impair diplomatic efforts and move the United States further from the Obama administration’s goal of getting the military out of foreign aid. Diplomats also say that military-led programs, without adequate input from the State Department, can overlook key human rights or governance concerns and heighten tensions with nations such as China and Russia, because foreign governments see assistance delivered by the U.S. military, rather than civilian agencies, as a potential threat. “We’ve got to balance the various components of our foreign policy,” said a senior State Department official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”

#### The State Department needs primacy to effectively establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” *WOLA*, <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)//BB>

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.

#### Even if both policies are equally resourced, the Department of State will be pushed into the supporting role

Oakley 19, Army strategist and currently serves as an assistant professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (David, “THE PROBLEMS OF A MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA’S PREMIER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-problems-of-a-militarized-foreign-policy-for-americas-premier-intelligence-agency/>)//BB

Neither is Stavridis the first retired military leader to voice this concern. In 2013, future secretary of defense James Mattis, then a Marine Corps general, famously quipped, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” In 2012, Karl Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, argued that the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and an unequal investment in the Defense Department over other departments resulted in the military becoming the “starting and relief pitcher for a number of foreign policy problems.” In a speech at Kansas State University in 2010, Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his concern with the Defense Department’s increasing role in foreign policy: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.” In an earlier interview, Mullen described a vicious cycle of policymakers turning to the military and increasing funding to the Defense Department because they have greater trust in military capability than in other agencies, and this greater funding in turn makes the military even more capable relative to other national security institutions. Instead of correcting a significant imbalance in resourcing national security capabilities, policymakers just turn to the military to handle an increasing array of missions. The military then becomes the lead while other organizations find themselves in supporting roles.

### AT DoD Tradeoff Links to CP

#### Security Cooperation is exclusively funded by the Department of Defense, and Security Assistance is exclusively Department of State funding.

White 14, Major, USMC, a Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7 (Taylor, “Security Cooperation How It All Fits” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72\_106-108\_White.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152407-220)

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, *Security Cooperation*. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of *security cooperation* appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as *security force assistance, foreign internal defense,* and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is *foreign assistance*, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for *foreign assistance* and *nation assistance*, we find significant overlap:

*Foreign assistance to foreign nations* [ranges] *from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3*

This term is likely to resonate with the State Department, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

*Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4*

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by State to be administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and other civilian agency involvement.

### AT DA Links to CP

#### The agent matters. Inclusion of DoD-led assistance creates incoherent solutions and undermines State-led diplomatic efforts

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking. The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money. The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.

#### Even if the counterplan seems like a minor distinction, it has a crucial bearing on how assistance is executed and perceived

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” *WOLA*, <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)//BB>

Why Does It Matter Whether Defense or State Controls Military Aid Programs?

The question of whether military aid and training programs should be funded by the Defense Department or the State Department may seem, at first glance, to be a subject more suited to civics textbooks than public debate. Yet the outcome of this debate will have a crucial bearing on how U.S. power is exercised and projected around the world. Let’s take a look at some examples from Latin America. n In 2006-2007, the congressional foreign operations subcommittees, which govern only State Department-funded military aid, learned about killings of civilians and other human rights violations by the Colombian army, which receives a annual military aid package. Responding to the subcommittees’ concerns, which invoked conditions in the foreign aid law, the State Department was forced to withhold temporarily $110 million worth of aid and training. More importantly, the State Department had to ask the Colombian government to take steps to curb killings of civilians by the army and to increase so-far glacial progress in investigating and prosecuting members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have committed crimes such as torture, murder, or collaborating with brutal illegal paramilitary forces. Only 25% of State Department- funded aid was subject to these conditions, so the overall aid program was not strongly affected, but human rights concerns played a more prominent role in the U.S.-Colombian government dialogue. On the other hand, all military aid through the Defense Department continued to flow during this time period, and no visible sign of any concern about human rights abuses emerged from the Armed Services Committees or Defense Appropriations subcommittees, which govern the aid flowing through the Defense Department. Had most military aid and training flowed through the defense bill, the U.S. government’s voice on human rights would have dropped to a whisper.4

#### The plan creates the perception of the US as a military-focused hegemon, the counterplan promotes a more peaceful diplomatic-focused perception

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf>)//BB

Why, one might ask, shouldn’t the military budget be the source of U.S. military aid overseas? The short answer is that equipping and training the world’s armies is a major foreign policy decision. For example, The choice to train and equip foreign militaries is perceived as a U.S. endorsement of those militaries. The relative balance of economic and military aid to a country affects perceptions about how the United States chooses to project its power. Strengthening a military can affect the balance of power within a geographic region, and within a country. The association of the United States with a particular military, especially one engaged in human rights violations, affects the image of our country. Instead of the regional and diplomatic considerations which concern the State Department, the Defense Department’s assigned mission requires it to adopt a military focus on potential national security threats. Military training and aid decisions, as a significant part of foreign policy, should be governed by the agency in charge of foreign policy and diplomacy—the State Department. And they should be overseen by the congressional committees whose jurisdiction is foreign affairs.

## NB---DIPLOMATIC CREDIBILITY

### Link

#### The plan militarizes diplomacy. That empowers the DoD and sidelines diplomats.

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billy, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Air War College, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)//BB

Militarization occurs when a state relies on the military to pursue national security objectives better achieved by other means.3 The DOD is criticized as having militarized US foreign policy through its new authority to build the capacity for foreign military forces to counter terrorism and support US military and stability operations. The controversy stems from the direct funding and authority now given to DOD, not the State Department which is responsible for US foreign assistance programs. The continuation of this authority, going on its sixth year and already costing more than $1.2 billion, shifts responsibility away from the State Department. Secretary of Defense Gates even warns of a “creeping militarization” of some aspects of American’s foreign policy when discussing the US military’s increased involvement in activities previously done by civilian agencies, and cautions against an overreliance on military combat operations.4 DOD involvement in foreign policy may undermine US foreign policy objectives. A shift in the core functions away from the State Department may have undesirable effects for several reasons. First, it may weaken the State Department’s role in implementing foreign policy. The State Department advances US interests in foreign countries and its authority may be weakened if DOD is also making decisions that impact US foreign policy. Second, it may weaken congressional oversight, particularly human rights protections, a large concern in many developing countries around the world. Congress authorizes and funds State Department-managed military assistance programs. State Department support that goes through the regular foreign assistance budget process is subject to conditions and closely scrutinized. In contrast, support that goes through the defense budget may receive far less review by foreign oversight committees. Third, it gives the Pentagon a greater diplomatic role and significant autonomy over support to foreign military forces, which has the potential to cause stronger military-to-military ties with a country than existing diplomatic ties.5 These effects may harm US foreign policy objectives. However, DOD involvement in US foreign assistance efforts is not without precedence.

#### Bleeding responsibilities to the DoD weakens State Department credibility

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, <https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)//BB>

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting. Policy Recommendations 1. The next administration should reassert the State Department’s control over foreign military training and assistance programs in its communication with the Congress, in interagency discussions and, most importantly, in the budget it presents for the State and Defense Departments.

### Link---AI

#### State Department leadership on AI is key to diplomatic credibility across-the-board

Dukeman 20, senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies. He previously helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics (Ryan, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/)//BB>

No such transformation is possible without congressional resourcing and executive sponsorship in the State Department. With some changes and investments, the State Department is well positioned to promulgate a democratic digital agenda that is aligned with American values, and to use investments in AI to transform its diplomatic and foreign policymaking functions. When discussing AI and innovation in government, it is common to fetishize technology and insist on its centrality to transformation. However, technological innovations should come with accompanying culture change, and leaders across the department should define and communicate the value of these innovations to the mission of diplomacy. Skepticism towards technology is as old as the diplomatic profession itself: Upon receiving his first telegraph message in the 1860s, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, for example, exclaimed, “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” Yet when used properly, AI can empower (rather than replace) career diplomacy like never before, putting civilian foreign policymakers back into the driver’s seat at home and overseas through leadership on a major “gray rhino” security threat and improved decision-making.

### Link---AT CP Drains DoS Resources

#### Diplomatic resources are not zero-sum

Blackwill and Fontaine 22, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, \*\*Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (Robert and Richard, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-09/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-should-slow-not-stop-u-s-pivot-to-china)//BB>

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

### !---Laundry List

#### Empowered State Department solves transnational threats and caps conflict

Burns 19, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The state of the State Department and American diplomacy,” *Belfer Center*, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/state-state-department-and-american-diplomacy)//BB>

The U.S. State Department serves a critical role for the nation. Its men and women in the Foreign and Civil Service are on the front lines for the U.S. in over 277 embassies and consulates abroad. They assist American citizens in distress, interview all foreigners seeking to enter the U.S. as visitors, immigrants and refugees. They help American companies to succeed overseas and represent the U.S. in global conferences and negotiations on every international issue of concern to the country from climate change to drug trafficking to nuclear proliferation and the fight against HIV/AIDs. As they represent the most powerful nation on earth, what American diplomats do and say overseas matters to the rest of the world. They work arm and arm with the U.S. military, lead negotiations to end wars and to achieve peace and are often the ultimate arbiters in ongoing disputes between Israelis and Palestinians, Indians and Pakistanis, Greeks and Turks. U.S. diplomats are highly trained, multilingual and have years of experience living and working abroad for their country.

### !---Turns Case/Alliances

#### Turns case---diplomatic failure wrecks the entire alliance structure

Haass 20, President of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

Diplomacy is a critical tool in a nation’s foreign policy tool kit, enabling a country to leverage its power and bring it to bear on critical international issues. The United States’ most enduring advantage over its rivals is its unprecedented network of alliances, and through consultations officials and diplomats maintain these relationships and enlist allies in common causes. Those representing the government are tasked to negotiate treaties, dealing with issues from arms control to climate change, and advance U.S. interests in international organizations. They are the face of America overseas, representing the country around the world and providing critical services to Americans traveling abroad. Too often, however, diplomacy is neglected. Sometimes serious diplomacy is sidelined in favor of unrealistic calls for regime change or demands that the other party cannot reasonably be expected to meet. A related problem, one highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, is that American foreign policy has become over-militarized, with the military asked to perform missions such as nation-building that it was never intended to. While the Department of Defense receives record appropriations, the Department of State struggles to have its comparatively small budget approved. In this valuable and timely Council Special Report, Jon Finer, an adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Uzra S. Zeya, the CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, propose policies for revitalizing the State Department and American diplomacy. They rightly assess that the Department of State “has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis.” They point out that the State Department is currently enduring turbulence but, equally important, that many of its problems are deep-seated and predate the Donald J. Trump administration. They provide an array of policy proposals they believe the State Department can and should implement to restore American diplomacy. The list of proposals is long, and few readers will agree with all of them. In some cases what is put forward will likely meet with bureaucratic or congressional resistance. What is clear and inarguable, though, is that U.S. foreign policy needs to better recognize and reflect the unique and valuable contributions of diplomacy. The State Department needs to rethink its organization along with the role of embassies and those who serve in them, attract individuals with more diverse backgrounds, skill sets, and experience, and reimagine career paths and training opportunities. The goal should be to attract the best and brightest to the State Department, be it for a career or a stint, and to invest in them so that those designing and carrying out American foreign policy have the creativity and professionalism required to meet the challenges and opportunities of a twenty-first-century world. All of which is to say that revitalizing the State Department should be a priority for the next administration regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.

### !---Turns China

#### Strengthened diplomacy makes the US less prone to pull the military lever in future crises

Oakley 19, Army strategist and currently serves as an assistant professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (David, “THE PROBLEMS OF A MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA’S PREMIER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-problems-of-a-militarized-foreign-policy-for-americas-premier-intelligence-agency/)//BB>

Stavridis echoed the warnings of other national security professionals that highlight a link to Haspel’s concerns. In 2008, Gates warned of the “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy. Arguing that the United States “cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” Gates stated the military should take a “supporting role” to diplomats in “America’s engagement with the rest of the world.” Loch Johnson, a former staffer on both the Church Committee and the Aspin-Brown Commission and a well-known intelligence studies academic, raised a similar question in his writings: “I continued to wonder if at least a few more resources directed toward national (civilian) intelligence targets wouldn’t make the United States more effective at diplomacy and less drawn toward war fighting.”

#### Managing China’s rise demands a shift to non-military diplomatic leadership

Burns 20, William Burns, contributing writer at The Atlantic, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former deputy secretary of state (William, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy,” *The Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/united-states-needs-new-foreign-policy/614110/)//BB>

A third vital priority is our greatest geopolitical challenge: managing competition with China. In recent decades, undisciplined thinking led us to assume too much about the benefits of engaging with China. Today, undisciplined thinking of a different sort is causing us to assume too much about the feasibility of decoupling and containment—and about the inevitability of confrontation. Our tendency, as it was during the height of the Cold War, is to overhype the threat, over-prove our hawkish bona fides, over-militarize our approach, and reduce the political and diplomatic space required to manage great-power competition. Preventing China’s rise is beyond America’s capacity, and our economies are too entangled to decouple. The U.S. can, however, shape the environment into which China rises, taking advantage of the web of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific—from Japan and South Korea to a rising India—who worry about China’s ascendance. That will require working with them—and engaging Chinese leadership directly—to bound rivalry with Beijing, define the terms for coexistence, prevent competition from becoming a collision, and preserve space for cooperation on global challenges. Everything rides on developing a strategy that reinforces—rather than trades against—these three interrelated priorities. China, obviously, is not America’s only geopolitical challenge, just by far the most important. We cannot ignore other regions where we have enduring interests: Europe remains a crucial partner, and North America our natural strategic home base, despite the current administration’s rare diplomatic feat of alienating the Canadians. Nor can we ignore the inevitable crises at home and abroad that so often derail the neatest of strategies. Armed with a clear sense of priorities, the next administration will have to reinvent U.S. alliances and partnerships and make some hard—and overdue—choices about America’s tools and terms of engagement around the world. And it’ll have to act with the discipline that so often eluded the U.S. during its lazy post–Cold War dominance. If “America First” is again consigned to the scrap heap, we’ll still have demons to exorcise—our hubris, our imperiousness, our indiscipline, our intolerance, our inattention to our domestic health, and our fetish for military tools and disregard for diplomacy. But we’ll also still have a chance to summon our most exceptional national trait: our capacity for self-repair. And we’ll still have a chance to shape our future, before it gets shaped for us by other players and forces.

### !---Democracy

#### Diplomatic credibility is key to democracy

Burns 20, Goodman Family professor of the practice of diplomacy and international relations, is chair of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Transatlantic Relations, director of the Future of Diplomacy Project, and a co-leader of the American Secretaries of State Project (Nicholas, “The Indispensable Power,” *Harvard Magazine*, <https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2020/07/features-forum-indispensable-power)//BB>

MY EXPERIENCE in government has also taught me that diplomacy is most effective when it is cemented in American values and the rule of law. That should lead us to stand up for democracy when it is threatened in NATO-allied countries such as Turkey and Hungary, and when human rights are assaulted in Russia and China. When I interviewed former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis a few months ago in Washington, he pointed to this foundational American strength. The United States exercises two great powers in the world, he said. The first is the “power of intimidation,” through our first-class military. But America has a second and more important power—the “power of inspiration” to the rest of the world, reflecting our nation’s democratic founding. A Harvard audience heard a variation of this theme from Winston Churchill in Memorial Hall on September 6, 1943, when he received an honorary doctorate of laws from President James B. Conant. In a lyrical speech entitled, “The Gift of a Common Tongue,” Churchill urged his audience of deans, professors, and dignitaries—and in later remarks in nearby Tercentenary Theatre, more than 6,000 cadets training to go to war—to reject isolationism and accept the mantle of world leadership. At a time when the United States had surpassed the British empire as the most powerful global leader, Churchill’s speech was a metaphorical handing of a baton to the young Americans on the front lines of World War II. “The price of greatness is responsibility,” he said. “One cannot rise to be in many ways the leading community in the civilized world without being involved in its problems, without being convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes.” Churchill’s words at Harvard then are as vital and relevant to Americans today. Americans can author a better, more just, and peaceful era if we recall our responsibility to lead and to be a force, through diplomacy, for democratic values in an ever more complex and dangerous world.

#### State Department strength solve Russian and Chinese aggression

Corinaldesi 21 (Gianluca, “PEACE STILL ULTIMATE GOAL OF DIPLOMACY,” Duke News, <https://today.duke.edu/2021/04/peace-still-ultimate-goal-diplomacy)//BB>

Instead of solely relying on military might, the U.S. needs to expand its diplomatic powers to safeguard the country and deal with authoritarian nations, a former U.S. ambassador told a Duke audience recently. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (2005-2008) and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Greece, said climate change and the global pandemic make clear the US “will have to create and nurture a grand coalition of countries to do something about it,” Burns said via Zoom. Burns was delivering the 2021 Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. Lecture on International Studies as the flagbearer of the United States Foreign Service, in which he served for more than 30 years. The Biddle Lecture is a bi-annual event organized by the Duke Center for International and Global Studies (DUCIGS) and established by Mary Duke Biddle Trent Semans, James H. Semans, and their family to honor Mrs. Semans' father, Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle, Jr., who had a distinguished career as a United States diplomat and was an original signer of The Duke Endowment. This lecture series symbolizes Duke University's continuing commitment to promoting international understanding and public service. The rising authoritarianism in some corners of the world is giving the U.S. a lot to deal with, Burns said. “China’s bid for global power and Russia’s assault on the independence and freedom of its neighbors [demand a] fully revived and rebuilt and restored State Department and Foreign Service,” he said, “wielding an unrivaled knowledge of negotiation, history, politics, and culture.”

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee ’18 (Carrie; is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, Air University, or Truman National Security Project; *The Truman Project*; September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; [https://medium.com/truman-doctrine-blog/why-democracy-promotion-is-in-the-strategic-interest-of-the-united-states-ae959c111b2f](about:blank); accessed 7/9/19; MSCOTT)

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting.

Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to investor confidence and growth. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for protecting private property than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a particularly attractive type of country for investors — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system encourage entrepreneurship and small business development, both of which are key to a growing and modernizing economy. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard.

Democracies also invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to increase overall societal productivity and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall costs of healthcare are driven down as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor.

Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which makes countries more politically stable. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and violent extremism.

This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly.

Finally, it has been empirically observed that democracies do not go to war with one another. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war, competitive elections and a free press make it easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries, consolidated democracies tend to be more wealthy and economically interdependent, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.

### !---Hegemony

#### Leading with diplomacy is key to all facets of US power

Blinken 20, Anthony Blinken, US Secretary of State, 2020 “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/>, (accessed 5-21-2022)//BB

One is that American leadership and engagement matter. We’re hearing this now from our friends. They’re glad we’re back. Whether we like it or not, the world does not organize itself. When the U.S. pulls back, one of two things is likely to happen: either another country tries to take our place, but not in a way that advances our interests and values; or, maybe just as bad, no one steps up, and then we get chaos and all the dangers it creates. Either way, that’s not good for America. Another enduring principle is that we need countries to cooperate, now more than ever. Not a single global challenge that affects your lives can be met by any one nation acting alone – not even one as powerful as the United States. And there is no wall high enough or strong enough to hold back the changes transforming our world. That’s where the institution I’m privileged to lead comes in. It’s the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation. President Biden has pledged to lead with diplomacy because it’s the best way to deal with today’s challenges. At the same time, we’ll make sure that we continue to have the world’s most powerful armed forces. Our ability to be effective diplomats depends in no small measure on the strength of our military. And in everything we do, we’ll look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength. As the President says, to not only build back, but build back better.

#### US power prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear war---China, Russia, Iran, and regional prolif---decline causes transition wars, counterbalancing, and re-intervention---no alternatives

Auslin et al, 17 - Auslin, resident scholar and director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute; Dueck, professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; Bromund, senior research fellow in Anglo-American relations at the Heritage Foundation (Michael Auslin, Colin Dueck, and Ted Bromund, "Reclaiming American Realism," Volume 1, Number 2, *American Affairs Journal*, May 2017, <https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/reclaiming-american-realism/>)

Having vanquished both Nazism and Communism in the space of a lifetime, American policymakers were all too eager to accept Francis Fukuyama’s declaration that history was over, even if they interpreted in different ways the license this gave them to remake the world. From Bill Clinton’s “democratic enlargement,” through George W. Bush’s freedom agenda, to Barack Obama’s retreats, we have been too willing to believe that the era of great power politics is over. Our optimism encouraged our interventions and excused our retreats. But geopolitical competition has not disappeared. Nor have our adversaries. The world is now less stable—and above all, less safe for American interests—than it was in 1991. And disorder is rising in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia. Today, nearly a generation after the collapse of Soviet Communism and over fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, it is undeniable that Europe is at greater risk, the Gulf is more war-torn, and the Pacific less secure than they were eight or eighteen years ago. We must arrest these trends, which threaten the central purpose of American foreign policy. The fact that they also threaten the “liberal international order” that many claim has characterized part of the world in the postwar era is merely an incidental fact, for it is our efforts to defend our interests that played the central role in defining that order. Today, focusing on the order, not U.S. interests, merely perpetuates a central fallacy of post–Cold War foreign policy: it emphasizes the waterwheel, not the water that makes it move. We are committed to a leading, though not dominating, American position in the world. But we also believe the United States has dangerously neglected to respect the limits on its vital role in the world. To recognize a world increasingly in disorder is obviously not to assert that all disorder threatens, or has the potential to threaten, American interests. Just as importantly, we recognize that we cannot live by postmortem. An obsessive focus on the past—above all, on the Iraq war—risks paralyzing us today. Much like the post–Vietnam War era, foreign policy is refracted through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan, and those on both sides who fought the bureaucratic battles of fifteen years ago continue to be shaped by the experience. It is time to move on, however, even as part of the challenge ahead remains responding to the threats the wars were designed to eliminate. Constructive conservative ideas will come from leaders, and a generation, less personally fixated on 2003, or on the post-1989 world, for that matter. If we are to understand what we must do in the world, we must return to the realism of the American political tradition, in which, as Washington put it, our interests are guided by justice. Securing American Freedom To recover that tradition, we should think again about the purpose of American foreign policy. Yes, it is to preserve the sovereign and independent American union. Yes, it is to protect our homeland. And yes, it is to keep us prosperous and at peace. But these are not ends in themselves. They exist to allow Americans, with due regard for the just laws of others when abroad, to be free—free to preach, to trade, to study, to help, to work, whether overseas or at home. That is how we conserve free America: by acting to make sure that individual Americans are free to live their own lives. The true purpose of U.S. foreign policy is to protect and promote the freedom of individual Americans, who by their own actions are remaking our world. We will enjoy that individual freedom more fully the more nations embrace the principles of democratic sovereignty on which our own union was founded. A world of unfree nations, a world divided into spheres of influence controlled by the hostile or the unfree, would be a world in which the freedom of Americans would be curtailed or, at worst, would exist only on the sufferance of others. But freedom for the world begins with freedom for America. The first, irreducible American interest is the preservation of the sovereignty of the United States and the political order of republican government under the Constitution. If we lose those, our other interests will be irrelevant, because we will not have the command of our own fortunes. No regime or idea that seeks to traduce the sovereignty of democratic nations is our friend, because our purposes cannot be realized in a world defined by the unfree. And we should remember one more thing: states that reject democratic sovereignty are implicitly rejecting our legitimacy. Indeed, our challengers today—just as in 1776, or 1917, or 1941, or 1950—are enemies of the sovereign democracies. In this most fundamental respect, nothing has changed: from the American Revolution to today, our challengers have always been imperialists, eager to claim the right to rule without the democratic consent of the governed. We have faced empires of power, of race, of class, and of religion—but empire, and the imperial struggle for power, is the constant. The problem is not that there are other great powers in the world with interests of their own. It is inevitable that great powers will not accept neighbors who threaten them; what is not acceptable is for great powers to interpret a desire for independence and good relations with other nations as inherently threatening. To do this is to claim the right to an imperial sphere that is based on a rejection of national sovereignty. The United States rejected one such claim in 1776. It has rejected many other, similar claims in the succeeding centuries. The sovereign democratic republic is not merely the freest form of government ever devised. It also defines the international system into which the United States was born, and on which its system of government is based. But today, supranationalists contemn the nation-state and muse, in the words of the president of the European Commission, that “borders were the worst invention ever.” Others are more malignant: Russia seeks to change borders, or render them meaningless, in order to suborn and dominate its neighbors; China seeks to impose an acceptance of its national interests on its neighbors; and Iran is making its dream of regional dominance into a reality—with the aid of Russia and the U.S.-brokered Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Worst of all, ISIS and al-Qaeda wish to eradicate the sovereign state and replace it with a religious empire. We need not be afraid of our competitors—or, indeed, of our enemies. However, we do need to acknowledge that that is what they are, to take them seriously, and to admit that they want a world organized in ways that are fundamentally antithetical to our principles. At times, it may be possible to find common interests with some of them. But we should entertain no illusions. An example from the past makes the point: We were not wrong to cooperate with Stalin to defeat Hitler. But we were wrong to delude ourselves by calling him Uncle Joe. The Challenges to and Importance of Our Alliances As Americans, we should know what it is to live in a tough, competitive world, because it was the world our nation was born into. That world endures, and no amount of post–Cold War fantasizing will make it disappear. From the start, we made our way in that world thanks to our alliances—for it was a military alliance with France that helped us win our independence. Provided that we retain the power to decide if we will fight—and we do—our alliances today raise no questions of principle. After all, we claimed the right to contract alliances in the Declaration of Independence itself. Nor are our alliances an act of charity. First and foremost, they have mostly been made with strategically important countries, traditionally those that have been able to help uphold order in their regions. Today, there is little disagreement in America that our allies should pay more, so as to do more. Every president since Eisenhower has asked for that, and with rare exceptions—such as Britain under Margaret Thatcher—they have asked in vain. We cannot sustain our alliances unless the American people believe that every member nation is making a fair contribution. But the problem is not that our allies are free riding on us, for when we cut our defenses, they do not increase theirs. It is that the history, culture, and politics of our allies now make them unwilling to accept that military strength is vital to diplomacy and deterrence alike. They have profound incentives to minimize, dismiss, and ignore threats—and hence not to spend enough on defense. For our European allies and Japan, the demands of the social welfare state, mixed with an understandably lingering horror at the memories of war, have combined over decades to make unpalatable most discussion of hard power and the need for martial readiness. The fear that returning to the world of machtpolitik will put at risk all they have built since 1945 is understandable, if unsuited to the current geopolitical environment. Yet we should still appreciate what we have in our allies. Tens of thousands of brave Americans gave their lives to create the alliances we have today. The costs we pay now are maintenance expenses on the peace they won. Of course, our allies benefit from this. But precisely because we are on top, we benefit most from the world as it is today, even if our complacency sometimes allows others to take advantage of the stability we created for their own malignant purposes. Our democratic allies, who wish—a little too hard—only to live in peace, feel the same way about the status quo. That does not mean we need to excuse the failings of our allies, indulge their supranational fantasies, outsource the defense of our interests to them, or allow them to completely outsource theirs to us. Instead, we need to have just as much realism about our allies as we have about our enemies. That means recognizing that what our allies lack is the luck that we in the United States enjoy. We are fortunate to have Canada and Mexico as neighbors; our allies, unfortunately, are next door to China, Russia, autocrats, and Islamists. Given our good fortune, and our strength, it is inevitable that we are the ones who are forward deployed, because we are the ones who have the geopolitical freedom to help. But we should remember that our deployments defend our place in the world—and the ability of Americans to be free in it—just as much as they defend our allies. Without our close alliances and the forward yet benign deployment of our forces, we would look out onto an unwelcoming Middle East and an increasingly troubled Asia, where Americans would be seen simply as outsiders, not as welcome partners by some. Moreover, the allies we have, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, Japan, and South Korea, are part of a global network of liberal societies and economies that dynamically interact and add immeasurably to global wealth, not least back in the United States. We cannot avoid becoming involved merely by retreating from our allies. American indifference or perceived weakness can engender instability that is not in our interests, and which forces us to consider more risky forms of involvement. For example, China’s buildup of forces in the South China Sea, and its efforts to dominate strategic waterways and raise doubts about future freedom of navigation, occurred in part due to its perception that America’s lack of active military alliances in Southeast Asia would make the United States unable to counter its expansion. To China, America is an interloper in areas it has traditionally dominated and considered part of its sphere of influence; thus, it believed that U.S. naval and air forces (which currently can only be transiently present in Southeast Asia), were a paper tiger and could be intimidated into eventual withdrawal. Washington, indeed, has struggled with trying to prove its credibility in keeping open vital sea lanes in the South China Sea, without having bases from which it can project a regular presence. That is why offshore balancing is an attractive concept in theory; in the real world, it would be all offshore and no balancing, as our allies and others would doubt our commitment to play a meaningful role during a crisis, and as the costs of “fighting our way back in” would be politically unacceptable at home. Our alliances also help us in another way. Without us, our smaller yet strategic allies would be unable to defend themselves, and our larger ones—Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, to name four—would have to fend for themselves. The cheapest way to do that would be to acquire nuclear weapons, which could lead to a cascade of nuclear proliferation. The resulting regional environments would be tense and unstable, and future crises could well become violent. We therefore need to reassure our friends as we deter our enemies—for the sake of greater stability that reduces the chances of a major conflagration in strategic areas drawing in American forces. Happily, our alliances, backed by our strength, are a means for us to do both at once. Part of the answer to the problems we face with our allies is for the free world to stop doing the things that alienate its publics and make it vulnerable to autocratic blandishments. Above all, we must stop centralizing power in the hands of unaccountable experts, an approach that, as the EU is belatedly discovering, only makes rejecting democracy more appealing. Another part of the answer is for the United States to make clear what side it is on. Starry-eyed “resets” or “open hands” towards aggressive, repressive regimes only confuse those who wish to rally beneath a flag of freedom and liberalism. Trying to win over the whole world risks losing those already on our side. Finally, our first choice should always be to deter trouble where it matters most, not to fight it: the example of Western Europe after 1945 is proof of the value of resolutely holding the line. Thus, the danger in this competitive world is not that we will be too strong. It is our weakness, not our strength, that is provocative, because American weakness makes our allies fearful and encourages our competitors to take chances. Providing strong defenses is both necessary for peace and a charge laid upon Congress by the Constitution. This charge must be fulfilled. A Realist Approach to Expeditionary Power Yet America’s geostrategic position means that we will usually act far from our shores, not least when we employ military power. Being primarily an expeditionary nation is not a limitation: it is a strength that allows us the flexibility to intervene in ways that respect the limits on our power. Going forward, we must emphasize our expeditionary nature, while remaining willing to base U.S. forces in strategic areas for reassurance and insurance purposes. This means, above all, that we must invest in precision airpower to inflict substantial damage, a strong navy to project power while maintaining freedom of the seas, credible land combat power to deter adversaries who threaten our allies, and homeland defense—including the most advanced missile defenses and cyber defenses. We face many perils, but in many cases, if we act rightly, time is on our side. The only thing that could truly hurt the United States in a way that would change us instantaneously and forever is a WMD attack. We must prevent such a catastrophe by any means necessary. But in defending ourselves, we must not be led into rash actions. President Trump is correct that our goal of peace is best achieved by a “disciplined, deliberate, and consistent foreign policy” backed by a strong America that understands that “caution and restraint are really truly signs of strength.” The restraint that President Trump and many of his liberal opponents praise means that the era of indiscriminate interventions, especially in pursuit of humanitarian objectives or to teach foreigners to elect good men, is over. This means privileging the interests of the American nation—and its people—over the larger, though fictive, international community. The lessons of World War II and the Cold War were too easily transmuted into the argument that our security policies must always be undergirded by morality. Today, we place more emphasis on the unquestioned evil of both Nazism and Communism than on the existential threat their power posed to Western civilization. It follows that for defenders of the supposed “liberal international order,” U.S. involvement in humanitarian crises or efforts at nation-building in inhospitable climates becomes the true measure of the legitimacy and wisdom of our foreign policy. When liberal states reveal their hypocrisy by not intervening in such crises, this delegitimizes them, and thereby makes it harder to advance arguments based on real national interests. The greatest risk of all is that, when do-gooding dominates policy, the American people are more likely to withdraw their support for defending our overseas interests. The path to a sustainable and strong U.S. role in the world does not rest in valorizing the “rules-based international order”: it rests in understanding the value and the limits of our power. Believe what you will about Iraq or Syria. The fact is that there is no public support for such interventions today. It would be an act of folly to press for actions that, for lack of that support, cannot be followed through to victory. It must be an ironclad rule for the United States that we do not start a fight we do not intend to finish. But this does not mean we give up the competitive struggle. Instead, we must find new ways to wage it. While we should not use our national strength to uphold a fictive international community, we should recognize that our interests rest in advancing towards a freer world. Thus, our goal has not changed: it is to help defend, and, where possible, to advance prudently towards a world built on sovereign democracies in which Americans can be safe and free. And the American constitutional order—if we keep faith with it—has great long-run strengths, which we can use in this struggle; it imposes limits on centralized power and the competition it encourages. Principle and prudence alike tell us that we must play the long game. Our method should not be imposed regime change, except in cases of vital national need: it should be the creation of leverage, the use of pressure, and the imposition of costs to constrain our opponents. It is a great mistake to believe that we must always meet our adversaries head on: for example, the U.S. development of hydraulic fracturing, which reduces world oil prices and thus damages the Russian economy, imposes costs on Russia and decreases its strategic influence. Our goal should be to seek out and use such indirect methods to encourage the buildup of opposing forces within other systems, and—as Ronald Reagan did—to build opportunities for negotiations to be conducted on our terms, not theirs. And at times, in part with the aid of this strategy, change may come in another way, preferably through peaceful transitions that reflect a change in culture, and not just a struggle for power. Such a failure to change the culture is why there was no revolution after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather the more efficient reorganization of power by a repressive clique. Yet autocracies are brittle: eventually they crack, especially when the people living under them seek to emulate more successful democracies. That is the great fear of the Chinese Communist Party and the reason why it is repressing civil society today. We can win this struggle not primarily through force of arms, but through persistence and flexibility, backed by strength and the preservation of our national power. The greatest strategic challenge we face today is not the strength of our main adversaries: it is the weakness of their neighbors, be they the smaller and still-developing nations of Southeast Asia vis-à-vis China, or the economically challenged and militarily weak nations of Europe facing Russia. By various means—hybrid war, political subversion, or fear induced by threats—these nations, some of them our allies, are being suborned in ways that we find hard to combat and are reluctant even to acknowledge. A world divided up into spheres of influence, largely controlled by our adversaries, would be neither stable nor free. While we cannot prevent powerful nations from having spheres of particular interest, it is not in our interest to allow them to exercise neo-imperial control over their neighbors. We are by instinct and by interest opposed to empires. If illiberal states dominate vital regions, such as East Asia or Central Europe, the result will not be good for the freedom of Americans in the world, or the idea of republican self-government, or for our relative power. It would thus be profoundly antithetical to the true purpose of our foreign policy.

### !---Counter-Terrorism

#### Diplomatic leadership is vital to effective counter-terrorism

Hartig 21, Executive Editor of Just Security. He is also Executive Director of National Journal's Network Science Initiative and Fellow, International Security Program at New America. Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council, former Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Luke, “Letting Diplomacy Lead US Counterterrorism: What Would That Look Like?,” *Just Security*, <https://www.justsecurity.org/75046/letting-diplomacy-lead-us-counterterrorism-what-would-that-look-like/>)//BB

Engage in savvy diplomacy and holistic interagency policymaking. Even a cursory look at the terrorist hot spots of the past two decades reveals that terrorist threats tend to emanate from complex environments. Underlying conditions typically include national or local government authorities struggling to provide basic services or to exert control over their territory, as well as deeper fragility issues, and terrorist groups exploit existing tribal, ethnic, or religious conflicts. Addressing terrorist threats in places like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, or Somalia requires not just establishing effective counterterrorism programming but engaging in savvy diplomacy to navigate both the political forces within each country as well as the outside forces trying to shape internal dynamics. And it requires an integrated foreign policymaking process that harnesses capabilities from across the U.S. government to address both the terrorist threat and the underlying issues. Yet, too often during the past two decades, counterterrorism has been treated as a standalone issue, with policy made in a separate set of meetings, and with key officials, especially those with development or deep regional expertise, absent from the table. To be sure, there are times when counterterrorism policymaking involves sensitive issues and limited participants – the bin Laden raid, for example. But in most cases, addressing a terrorist threat requires thinking holistically about the underlying problems and the tools available to neutralize the immediate threat, fortify partners against future threats, and develop longer-term programming to address the drivers of violent extremism. It also requires seasoned diplomats who can navigate inside the country and externally. The Obama administration’s approach to the counter-ISIS campaign – at least after the group swept across northern Iraq in its shocking initial assaults – provides a good example of what integrated policymaking and savvy diplomacy can look like in action. Counterterrorism and regional policy officials at the National Security Council jointly chaired policymaking meetings focused on bringing a range of resources to bear in the campaign and navigating tricky geopolitical issues regarding Iran, the Kurds, Turkey, Syria, and Russia. A dedicated special presidential envoy traveled the globe building an unprecedented coalition to support a range of civilian and military efforts. Top-notch diplomatic teams in the region successfully navigated Iranian anxiety over U.S. operations, Turkish concerns over U.S. work with the Kurds, and potential Syrian pushback on U.S. operations in northeastern Syria. We saw what happened when this careful approach was abandoned in the Trump administration. Tensions spiked with Iran, Trump assented to a Turkish military offensive that betrayed our Kurdish partners, U.S. forces had near misses with Russian forces, and the Syrian regime began to extend its murderous reach into Eastern Syria. The U.S. military also made advances against ISIS in the past four years, but without the right mix of civilian expertise and savvy diplomacy, those gains may well prove unsustainable. Further, while this piece primarily focuses on approaches to jihadist terrorism, smart diplomacy will be just as important as the United States responds to a rising wave of right-wing terrorism, often enabled by countries like Russia. Overall, integrated policymaking and savvy diplomacy, both in response to specific terrorist groups and as part of forging a renewed approach to multilateral counterterrorism, will only be more important going forward, as the administration draws down the “forever wars” and refocuses on great power competition. With likely less focus on counterterrorism at the National Security Council than in the Obama administration, an empowered State Department will need to proactively lead. It will need to develop policies and programs to aid countries facing terrorist threats, sustain steady multinational efforts to address terrorism, and work directly with the Defense Department to ensure military operations complement diplomatic strategies.

#### Overly militarized foreign policy fails to solve terrorism---State Department leadership is key

Hartig 21, Executive Editor of Just Security. He is also Executive Director of National Journal's Network Science Initiative and Fellow, International Security Program at New America. Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council, former Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Luke, “Letting Diplomacy Lead US Counterterrorism: What Would That Look Like?,” *Just Security*, <https://www.justsecurity.org/75046/letting-diplomacy-lead-us-counterterrorism-what-would-that-look-like/)//BB>

There are, of course, many other things that the State Department can do to promote civilian approaches to counterterrorism. For example, its foreign terrorist designations, work on sanctions, efforts to prevent the flows of foreign fighters and repatriate them, coordination with homeland security entities, and other functions are all critical. But addressing the bigger changes described above would be first steps toward putting diplomacy and aid at the center of U.S. counterterrorism policy. After nearly two decades of militarized approaches to counterterrorism, the United States may finally have the political will, leadership, and resources to fulfill that vision.

#### Nuclear terror leads to extinction

Toon 7, PhD, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder (Owen B., et al., “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” *Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics*, 7)//BB

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

## SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF

### Solvency---General/Short

#### Counterplan solves best. Less waste, avoids bureaucracy, minimizes militarized responses to crises.

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

Conclusion

Moving resources to the State Department to conduct security assistance would result in more effective aid that is less likely to be wasted or flow to abusive partners. It would also reduce unnecessary bureaucracy from the current system. This would be an important step toward undoing the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and would give an important foreign policy tool back to American diplomats. The new administration should move quickly to consolidate security assistance resources under the State Department, with accompanying reforms to the bureaucracy and workforce that handles these issues. Congress should support this realignment and transfer the necessary authorities and resources from the DOD to the State Department.

### Solvency---NATO

#### Achieving consensus at NATO requires diplomatic, not military, efforts

Burns 21, Professor of Diplomacy and IR at Harvard (Nicholas, “A Time for Diplomacy,” *Belfer Center*, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/time-diplomacy)//BB>

Diplomacy also works best when far-sighted leaders take charge of a crisis and point the way ahead. Think of: FDR and Churchill’s organization of a massive global coalition to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, and George H.W. Bush’s negotiations to unite Germany in the NATO Alliance and to end the Cold War. Nelson Mandela who used a four-year diplomatic negotiation to dismantle and destroy the apartheid regime. Angela Merkel who led the world diplomatically in confronting and sanctioning Vladimir Putin following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomacy and negotiations, of course, do not always succeed. At its worst, if diplomacy fails, war, lawlessness, and destruction ensue – Vietnam, Rwanda, and Iraq in the past. Syria, Tigray, Myanmar, and China’s power grab in the South China Sea in the present. That is one reason why it is so important to integrate effectively the work of ambassadors and Generals combined with the unique power of intelligence officers. Foreign policy making in the U.S. Government is a team sport. It takes coordination among all the country’s actors to succeed. We diplomats understand that our ability to succeed is often related directly to the intelligence on which we depend and the military partners with whom we share power. It has long been understood that diplomacy and defense are inextricably tied to each other. When I was U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the majority of my staff was from the Pentagon – both the uniformed military and Defense Department civilians. We thought hard about aligning our diplomatic moves with our military might. When we responded to the 9/11 attacks, we drew on the resources of both diplomats and warriors. When NATO went into Afghanistan, we thought of it as a combined military and diplomatic mission. What has been missing in the U.S. government in recent years is a strong, energetic, self-confident diplomatic corps. President Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken have shown they appreciate the need to elevate diplomacy as a first-order priority for the United States. From their first days in office, they have emphasized their determination to strengthen America’s diplomatic power in the world. President Biden chose the State Department as the site of his first foreign policy speech. Some of his earliest and most notable appointments immediately strengthened our diplomatic bench behind Secretary Tony Blinken – Ambassadors Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Wendy Sherman, Victoria Nuland, and Samantha Power, as well as an impressive and experienced NSC team led by Jake Sullivan, Jon Finer, Kurt Campbell, Laura Rosenberger, Sumona Guha, and many others. For President Biden’s new emphasis on diplomacy to succeed, however, the career Foreign Service, in particular, will need to be strengthened dramatically. It is no secret that the Foreign and Civil Service are at their lowest points in morale and effectiveness in the memory of anyone listening today in this Zoom room. I began my diplomatic career 41 years ago as an intern at our embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the Sahara Desert. I have witnessed many highs and lows of American diplomacy since. Frankly, I have been shocked to see the damage done to the career Foreign Service during the last four years. The result is disastrously low morale, a lack of budgetary support, the debilitating departure of some of our most senior career diplomats, the sidelining of the Service for a time, and the resulting lack of confidence in its future by a younger generation of diplomats who will be most critical to its resurrection. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have a rare opportunity to lead a radical overhaul at the State Department. Under their leadership, this must remain a first-order priority for the administration. In November just following the Presidential election, two former American Ambassadors, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries, and I released a Harvard Kennedy School report entitled, “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Our goal was to recommend the fundamental steps necessary to reform the Foreign Service and to reposition it for success in the future. Based on conversations with over 200 people inside the U.S. government and beyond in over 40 workshops during the past pandemic year, we reported that the Foreign Service “is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.” We recommended a determined, bipartisan effort to revive and restructure it. Specifically, we called for a new Foreign Service Act by Congress to set a renewed mission and mandate for the 21st century diplomatic corps. The last time Congress passed such an Act was in 1980 when the world was a very different place with very different challenges. than it is now. We advocated a “relentless focus on diversity” to counteract the woeful lack of progress in the percentage of African Americans, women, Latinx Americans, Asian Americans and other minorities in the senior ranks of American diplomacy. We called for the creation of a new Diplomatic Reserve Corps and a Mid-Level entry program to ensure the inclusion in the diplomatic ranks of experienced citizens with specialized skills. Given the proliferation of political appointee Ambassadors at the State Department, we also recommended that, by 2025, 90 percent of Ambassadors should be career appointees, not 70 percent as is the current practice. We also recommended that 75 percent of the powerful Assistant Secretary of State positions be held by career officers. During the Trump Administration, not a single one of these Assistant Secretary positions was led by a Senate-confirmed career officer. This was the first time in memory that the Foreign Service had been entirely unrepresented at that critical leadership level. Finally, we proposed to rename the “Foreign Service of the United States” the “United States Diplomatic Service.” We believe it signals transformation and reinforces the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. This new title would begin with the two words, of course, that are most important – United States. A reinforced career diplomatic corps would help President Biden and his successors from either party to revive American leadership in the world. President Biden’s great insight has been to see our alliances as the critical asset we have in this long-term battle for global power and the future of democracy. The NATO Alliance is fundamental to a long-term peace in Europe. It has expanded a zone of security to encompass the great majority of Europeans, East and West. It protects all of us, particularly smaller countries, from the Russian Bear. It will be largely a diplomatic task to return the U.S. to leadership of the Alliance and to maintain allied unity in containing Russia power in the next few days, weeks, months, and years.

#### “Security Assistance” solves. It builds capacity in NATO to deter shared threats.

Tankel 20, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, (“RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/>, (accessed 5-21-2022)//BB

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

#### The State department is best for achieving successful multilateral diplomacy

Powell 22, career member of the United States Foreign Service who served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources, et al (Jo Ellen, “Bringing America’s Multilateral Diplomacy into the 21st Century,” Academy of Diplomacy, <https://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Bringing-Americas-Multilateral-Diplomacy-into-the-21st-Century-FINAL.pdf)//BB>

In his February 4, 2021, address to the U.S. Department of State, President Joseph R. Biden declared “diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.”1 The President called on the Department of State to meet accelerating global challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, by working in common with other nations. He spoke of global diplomacy, and global power, as America’s inexhaustible source of strength and its abiding advantage. Many perceive that advantage has eroded over the years. Today, the Department of State has a singular opportunity to lead an interagency collaboration to restore that advantage, with the support of the Administration and other interested agencies. To achieve this, the State Department cannot exclusively rely on its traditional model of bilateral diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy must become a greater focus of the Department’s efforts. To effectively address the global challenges the President discussed, the Department must exert equal effort in its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. Although the U.S. remains virtually unmatched in its economic and social influence and power, the gap between it and the competition is narrowing. It is no longer true (if it ever was) that the U.S. does not need a global range of partners to address global crises. China is rapidly extending its presence and influence in international organizations, including international financial institutions, as are other countries, such as Russia and India. The U.S. must build strong and enduring partnerships with countries beyond its traditional alliances, particularly in Latin America and Africa. As political dynamics and world powers shifted, the U.S. response was often to disengage from multilateral diplomacy. Yet, disengagement did not lead to resolution. We must set aside the notion that international organizations excessively constrain or disproportionately burden the United States. To manage the global issues we face today and for the foreseeable future, we need to work with a global coalition of partners, even when not all of them agree with the United States all the time. In considering how to meet these challenges, it is useful to examine how other countries have maximized their multilateral influence. Smaller nations often see international organizations as the most effective way to leverage their influence. The Nordic countries are an oft-cited example of the smart application of multilateral diplomacy, but the U.K., France, Japan, and Germany also give considerable weight and attention to multilateral diplomacy, with highly effective results. These successful practitioners of multilateral diplomacy have several practices and approaches in common. Their diplomats’ entry-level training includes serious emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and negotiation; their career paths often involve multiple assignments to or within international organizations; and their foreign ministries are actively engaged in recruitment and advocacy for placement in international bodies of highly qualified applicants at all levels, from interns to senior executives. Other characteristics they share that the U.S. cannot easily adopt are greater ease of movement between their Civil and Foreign Services and the absence of an “up or out” promotion system. Both sets of characteristics enhance those countries’ flexibility to second personnel to international organizations, and the latter somewhat offsets the nearly universal perception that secondments are not helpful to one’s career. Effective multilateral diplomacy is essential for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy objectives and effective bilateral engagement is arguably the most critical element of successful multilateral diplomacy. U.S. diplomats must set the standard, not just throughout the U.S. government, but worldwide, for effective multilateral diplomacy. Our recommendations to achieve this fall into three categories: policy, practice, and preparation.

### Solvency---Emerging Tech

#### State Department is the best agency to set national policy on emerging tech

Saeed 21, Ferial Ara Saeed is CEO of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a risk management firm providing clients strategic guidance and analysis of political and economic trends. A former senior American diplomat with expertise on North Asia and the Middle East, she served as deputy U.S. coordinator for information and communications technology policy at the State Department, on the country desks for China, Japan, and Korea, and she advised both the undersecretary of state for economic and business affairs and the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security (Ferial Ara, “A STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THE DIGITAL AGE,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/a-state-department-for-the-digital-age/)//BB>

America faces a tidal wave of challenges wrought by unprecedented and ubiquitous advances in emerging technologies and the rise of China as an anti-democratic economic superpower. The State Department has a leading role to play in addressing both challenges. Consolidating all technology issues under a single undersecretary would significantly strengthen the department’s hand in the interagency policymaking process. The department is better positioned than its interagency counterparts to articulate a national emerging technology policy that accounts for the full range of U.S. national interests, not just those related to security. Multidimensionality is the State Department’s core comparative advantage. Consolidation would reinforce it. No other agency has the mandate, the expertise, and the credibility to compel consideration of that vital perspective. Without it, the United States risks undermining its complex geostrategic interests with over-securitized responses to rivalry with China and the related, evolving challenges presented by the most rapid technological change ever experienced in human history.

#### New State Department bureau solves expertise and norm development on emerging tech

Bade 22, tech and policy analyst @ Eurasia Group (Scott, “Digital diplomacy gets a reboot,” Tech Crunch, <https://techcrunch.com/2022/04/08/digital-diplomacy-gets-a-reboot/>)//BB

CDP [Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy] will have three policy buckets: international cyber security, digital policy and digital freedom. Each roughly corresponds to preexisting competencies: the cyber coordinator office (created back in 2011), the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, respectively. It will be run by a yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador-at-large; in the meantime, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus will run the team as principal deputy assistant secretary. While the new bureau will deal with the day-to-day, a separate special envoy position will also be created to focus on more long-term issues around emerging and critical technologies like AI, quantum and biotechnology. Missing in action no more? The “decision to stand up a new bureau is an indicator of how seriously [the Biden administration] sees these threats,” Eileen Donahoe, a former U.S. ambassador who now runs the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, tells me. “They understand the need for more thought leadership and diplomatic capacity.” One sign of that seriousness is that both offices will, for at least a year, report directly to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the department’s number two official. This is a good thing, says Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration’s top diplomat on cyber issues. Sherman, he says, has a long history with cyber issues and worked to integrate technology issues at regional bureaus she ran earlier in her career. CDP will need that high-level support. The State Department is playing catch up, I’m told, and attempting to bring its expertise — diplomacy and knowledge of international relations — to more technical policymakers at the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and other agencies. The implication is clear: State’s voice has been missing in the interagency process and opportunities have been missed both at home and abroad. For example, as Nate Picarsic and Emily de la Bruyère have written, the U.S. has been largely absent from the politics of the intergovernmental organizations that are quietly setting the global standards of technology. As a result the U.S. has ceded ground to others, especially Russia and China, but even the European Union, with massive implications for who controls the future of technology. And as new international entities emerge, like the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council or the Quad’s technology working group, the State Department needs to be able to coordinate and advise. Under the Trump administration, you “had good, talented people,” working these issues, Painter tells me, “but no one at the leadership level [able] both to deal with the White House and senior counterparts and foreign counterparts. [The new bureau] helps fill that gap.” “This is a real down payment by the department,” says Yll Bajraktari, a former national security official who is now the CEO of Special Competitive Studies Project, an AI advocacy group. “Integrating the department’s capacity for cybersecurity, digital infrastructure and governance issues including internet freedom will help create a coherent diplomatic strategy.”

#### That new policy bureau is the best approach for diplomacy in the digital age

Thompson and Bate 21, \*Ph.D. student in political science at Yale University. Previously, she was a research analyst for the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and a research assistant and James C. Gaither junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working with the Technology and International Affairs Program on projects related to disinformation and cyber security. She tweets at @natalierthom, \*\*Laura Bate is a senior director with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and a 2021 Next Generation National Security Fellow with the Center for a New American Security. Previously, she was a policy analyst with New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative and remains an International Security Program Fellow (Natalie and Laura, “THE RIGHT WAY TO STRUCTURE CYBER DIPLOMACY,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/the-right-way-to-structure-cyber-diplomacy/)//BB>

The Devil Is in the Details, But a Cyberspace Policy Bureau Is the Best Approach The unfortunate political reality is that reorganizing the State Department is hard. That alone is not a reason to forgo reform, but it does introduce constraints on what may be feasible. Any new office or bureau will need leaders, but current law strictly limits the rank that they can hold. Creating a new under secretary, or even a new assistant secretary, would require significant changes to the State Department Basic Authorities Act, and there is limited political momentum for that particular undertaking. The law currently authorizes the appointment of 24 assistant secretaries and six under secretaries. Although the Cyberspace Solarium Commission initially recommended creating an assistant secretary position to lead a new cyber bureau — and although it has been clear for two decades that the State Department’s structure should be overhauled — making such drastic changes to the necessary legislation may be a nonstarter on Capitol Hill for the foreseeable future. The Cyber Diplomacy Act provides the best available work-around by placing an ambassador-at-large at the head of the new bureau, ensuring that the position has the stature necessary for effective leadership. The new bureau would also have to contend with the challenges of prioritization. The Cyber Diplomacy Act lists a wide variety of issues — including internet access, internet freedom, digital economy, cybercrime, deterrence, and international responses to cyber threats — that would become a cyberspace bureau’s responsibilities. Even without giving it emerging technology topics to handle, consolidating just cyberspace policy issues will require careful planning to determine which pieces get pulled from existing bureaus. To allow a new bureau to adequately deal with digital economy matters, for example, policymakers would need to decide which aspects of that issue get moved from the purview of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. The new bureau would have a good case for inheriting responsibility for portfolios like investment in information communications technology infrastructure abroad, particularly as it relates to cyber security capacity building, but there is a strong argument for other pieces like e-commerce to remain in their existing homes. The more bearing a particular team’s work has on preserving an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the more it should be considered a strong candidate for incorporation into a new bureau. Moving the responsibility for particular policy matters is not the only tool available, however. The Cyber Diplomacy Act creates an avenue for the new bureau’s personnel to engage other State Department experts to ensure that concerns like human rights, economic competitiveness, and security have an influence on the development of U.S. cyber policy. The proposed Cyberspace Policy Coordinating Committee would ensure that officials at the assistant secretary level or higher from across the department can weigh in on matters of concern for their respective portfolios. With a new cyberspace policy bureau, a coordinating committee, and enhancements to emerging technology capacity in its existing regional and functional bureaus, the State Department would be structured to handle the digital age effectively.

### Solvency---Trust

#### Only non-military assistance promotes the trust necessary for Security Assistance to succeed

Stohl 16, senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center (Rachel, “The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance,” World Politics Review, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19963/the-pitfalls-of-the-pentagon-taking-the-lead-on-u-s-security-assistance)//BB

Oversight and transparency over these myriad programs are often extremely difficult. Numerous government accounts provide this money, and depending on the program, different congressional committees maintain oversight. The stove-piped nature of U.S. military assistance and the steadfast secrecy that surrounds decisions made for reasons of “national security” often create an artificial division between national security interests and foreign policy ideals. They also make it nearly impossible to identify the exact amount of spending, to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of various programs, and to avoid duplicating resources and efforts across different offices and agencies. This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones. But from the outset, the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts. For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Beyond the lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Similarly, in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence. And although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department. The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion. However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals. It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money. At a fundamental level, when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships. They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.

#### DoD personnel are viewed with suspicion

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA493001.pdf>)

The use of military forces may also impede the advancement of foreign policy goals. For instance, the December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, viewed the use of DOD personnel for counterterrorism programs as an obstacle: “In Latin America, especially, military and intelligence efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.”64 As pointed out in Appendix F on counternarcotics cooperation, Mexico has resisted counternarcotics assistance that would involve the U.S. military. One analyst claims that “African publics and governments have already begun to complain that U.S. engagement is increasingly military.”65

Start Footnote 63

63 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., states that there is evidence that some host country nationals question “the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of the country to help local communities build wells, erect schools and carry out other small development projects to help mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether the military was there to take sides in the conflict.” p. 12.

End Footnote 63

#### Diplomats are more likely to follow through on commitments

Casler 21, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, Columbia University (Don, “Credible To Whom? The Organizational Politics of Credibility in International Relations,” *Mershon Center Working Papers*, <https://mershoncenter.osu.edu/sites/default/files/2021-04/Casler_NWR_Draft.pdf>)//BB

Diplomats’ conception of credibility derives from their wide range of duties: translating between the home government and the world; providing early warning of troubles and opportunities; building and fixing relationships; and integrating the military, economic, and intelligence tools of statecraft.53 Diplomats are socialized to be experts in communication, relationship management, and negotiation — whether because they are career civil servants steeped in the art of diplomacy or because they enter government from business or law, where such skills also receive special emphasis. As a result, their self-image is as the first line of defense against international strife,54 or the process-oriented analyst and reporter who keeps the home government informed, represents its interests, and cajoles others into doing what the home government wants. Securing others’ trust is essential for each of these objectives, making diplomats highly focused on the personal and behavioral dimensions of cultivating relationships.55 This means that diplomats constantly and keenly observe how the home government is perceived across a broad range of issues, events, and commitments, which they see as tightly interconnected. The wide scope of diplomats’ core mission inculcates a broad definition of national interests and a capacious understanding of what the home government’s actions can indicate to international audiences.56 Since their chief objective is to cultivate strong, durable impressions and relationships that will persist over anticipated future interactions, I argue that diplomats conceive of credibility primarily in terms of national interests and signaling reputation — in other words, as the willingness to keep commitments and bear costs. Military officers’ conception of credibility stems from their military education, which limits the proper role of military force in foreign policy to traditional security goals such as protecting territory, geostrategic positions, and allies.57 This experience socializes military officials to be experts in managing violence through specialized training in military operations, tactics, and logistics.58 As a result, their self-image is as the goal-oriented technician, taking sober stock of a given task’s hard capability requirements.59 Because they are attentive to the nuts and bolts of military interventions as well as all that can go wrong in war, military officials hold a pessimistic professional viewpoint that typically demands maximum capabilities to address any contingency.60 This manifests in the military ethic of “conservative realism,” stressing the possession of ready forces to meet potential challenges and opposing the extension of commitments or issuance of threats unless the capacity to follow through exists.61

### Solvency---Evolution

#### Only diplomats can adapt to evolving circumstances to ensure overall mission success

Toft 18, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School (Monica, “THE DANGEROUS RISE OF KINETIC DIPLOMACY,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/the-dangerous-rise-of-kinetic-diplomacy/>)//BB

But the difficulty is that the U.S. public, along with most of its representatives in Congress, have no way of knowing whether these deployments — though no doubt ideal as compared to the alternative of major conventional wars — are having a positive net effect. In order to know that we would need a fully functioning Department of State whose diplomats on the ground could help guide and inform ongoing and future special operations force deployments. The Trump administration’s hollowing out of the State Department — which is historically unprecedented — makes it progressively difficult to deal with the underlying causes of the violent extremist organization threat, and to know whether kinetic diplomacy is helping or hurting U.S. and allied interests.

### Solvency---AT Leverage/Cooperation

#### Military assistance creates reverse leverage that causes client-state aggression

Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Number 7)//BB

In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.

#### Military aid undermines cooperation with US efforts

Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Number 7)//BB

Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional ‘‘arms for influence’’ explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

#### Post-military aid, allies will work against US interests

Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Number 7)//BB

In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient’s ‘‘security value’’ directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

#### The larger the military package, the more uncooperative the ally

Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Number 7)//BB

Despite its limitations, our study offers a novel approach to the foreign aid and influence puzzle. And our results uncover interesting relationships that deserve greater theoretical and empirical attention in future research. Clearly, the relationship between US military aid and recipient state cooperation is far from straightforward. The bulk of our evidence pens a cautionary tale for policymakers; although military assistance may achieve the specific goals for which it was allocated, it appears to generate less cooperative behavior from recipient states overall. US military aid levels may be more indicative of American dependence on recipient states than of US influence over client states. Contrary to the vast majority of the existing literature on foreign aid, our results suggest military aid is neither a carrot nor a stick; US assistance is given to countries that the United States depends on for some foreign policy ‘‘good’’ and the United States will continue to provide such aid as long as that ‘‘good’’ is valued in Washington. With this knowledge, recipient state behavior is actually likely to be increasingly uncooperative as levels of American dependency (and subsequent aid packages) increase.

### Solvency---AT DoD Key

#### DoD is only key during wartime, they could follow-on later if a war breaks out

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

While there are times when it is appropriate for the DOD to have the authority to directly provide assistance to a partner, these programs should be exclusive to when the United States is at war and fighting side by side with allied or partner forces. In these cases, such as in active combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, it may make sense for the Pentagon to have its own authorities to assist foreign partners. But outside these wartime situations, and especially in light of today’s efforts to end the forever wars, the State Department is fully able to oversee and manage the bulk of U.S. security assistance programs.

### Solvency---AT Military Articles

#### The DoS can work with defense agencies of foreign countries, and that’s NOT security cooperation

Tankel 20, Stephen Tankel, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020 (Stephen, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/)//BB>

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

#### The counterplan is the DoS, but they are still responsible for military articles. And, that’s not Security Cooperation.

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

### Solvency---AT DoS Atrophy

#### No workforce atrophy, and if there is, and it’s self-correcting

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB

But this situation can be reversed. The State Department’s ranks are still among the most talented professional public servants anywhere in the government. When properly empowered and entrusted with significant responsibilities, American diplomats play essential roles in consequential outcomes for the country—from the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord in the Barack Obama administration to the Afghanistan peace process and the release of American prisoners from various countries under President Trump. And its current predicament could make the State Department itself, which has long resisted fundamental reform, more open to badly needed changes. This report does not speak to every challenge the State Department faces but rather highlights the reform areas that we identified as reflecting greatest need based on discussions with veteran diplomats and other experts.

#### The State Department is highly capable and should have total control over foreign assistance

Roberts 17, Former Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at Heritage (James, “America Needs a Stronger State Department, Not an ‘Independent’ Foreign Aid Agency,” Heritage, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/america-needs-stronger-state-department-not-independent-foreign-aid-agency)//BB>

Just as is the case overseas, where the U.S. ambassador is the senior-most official in an American embassy, in Washington the secretary of state should have undisputed authority over decisions about allocating U.S. foreign assistance. The State Department—highly competent, well-equipped, appropriately staffed and resourced—should include a foreign assistance component. That is what countries such as Canada, Denmark, and Sweden already have done.

## SOLVENCY---CYBER

### Solvency---Cyber

#### The State Department is comparatively the best actor for leading cyber policy. They promote consensus with allies on norms, capacity building, intel-sharing and resilience

Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*, <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217>)//BB

The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of restoring stability to cyberspace, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the bureaucratic competencies and personnel to enact forward-looking cyber diplomacy, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states. Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet. Competitive allied cyber diplomacy can shape the standards and norms that determine the future of the internet. A competitive cyber diplomacy relies on the State Department's core competency in creating bilateral and multilateral agreements for capacity building, threat intelligence sharing, resilience measures, and to promote best practices in a competitive cyber ecosystem. Diplomats understand countries' strategic and political environments, and the State Department has the capacity to scale Hunt Forward operations. USCC [US Cyber Command] encounters limits in growing Hunt Forward. Collaboration between the State Department and USCC may present the best avenue to consensually operate in other countries' networks to observe malicious actors. The State Department will guide the United States' cyber diplomacy, not USCC [US Cyber Command], and integrating cyber authorities will create synergies for how the United States can restore stability in cyberspace and safeguard the United States' cybersecurity.

#### The State Department best shapes global cyber policy. AND, their initiatives are followed by the DoD to keep cyber engagement below thresholds of armed conflict

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The Department of State should contribute more directly to efforts to disrupt, degrade, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior. It can do so by leveraging diplomatic channels to increase routine and agile collaboration with partners and allies for continuous pressure against adversary campaigns below the level of armed conflict. The goal would be to frustrate and thwart cyberspace aggression before it harms the United States and its allies. This approach would allow the United States to be more responsive to great-power competition, enable and sustain similar efforts by the Department of Defense, and complement the cyber deterrence initiative. Closer synergy between promoting norms of responsible state behavior in international venues and conducting persistent cyberspace operations that expose and contest behavior inconsistent with such norms has the best chance of producing a convergence of expectations (i.e., norms) on acceptable behavior. Mutually reinforcing efforts across the U.S. government to deter, disrupt, expose, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior can produce the synergy between defense and foreign policy needed for great-power competition. This, however, requires a reevaluation of cyber diplomacy priorities, activities, lines of effort, and mindset.59 Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense. Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.

#### DoS solves cyber detection, deterrence and mitigation

Fisher 21, serves as a Portfolio Manager in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Global Programs and Initiatives at the U.S. Department of State (Benjamin, “U.S. Diplomats Build Cyber Defense and Cybersecurity Partnerships Worldwide,” *Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-diplomats-build-cyber-defense-and-cybersecurity-partnerships-worldwide/)//BB>

The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) works in partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense to strengthen U.S. allies and partners worldwide through training, equipment, and capacity building projects that allow us to work together more effectively to meet shared security challenges. With the growth of malicious cyber activities worldwide, including intrusions and ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure, U.S. diplomats have recognized the importance of helping partners enhance the governance of security institutions, and strengthening their capacity to detect, deter, and rapidly mitigate, and respond to international cyber threats and incidents. Cyber Advisors of the Global Defense Reform Program Strong and effective security sector institutions are key to strong security partnerships. The Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), managed by the PM Bureau’s Office of Global Programs and Initiatives (GPI) works with partners to develop and implement organizational reforms to modernize their security institutions, enhance effectiveness and accountability, and better align the security sector to the needs and challenges of the partner nation and its citizens, in places like Albania, Palau, and Kosovo. GDRP advisors assigned to Ecuador, Argentina, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia work side-by-side with counterparts in partner governments’ ministries of defense (MOD) to address cyber defense and cybersecurity challenges. Together, they are working to draft national-level strategies, policies, and procedures; streamlining coordination among agencies in their respective governments involved in cyber issues; establishing effective “command and control”; and recruiting, training, sustaining, and retaining a skilled cyber workforce. Beyond the knowledge these subject matter experts bring to strategic-level cyber planning, these engagements bolster U.S. foreign policy objectives related to cyber defense and cybersecurity. Ecuador Following a series of incidents, including threats to election platforms, data breaches, and coordinated malicious cyber activity against Ecuador’s government agencies, U.S. Embassy Quito seized the opportunity to partner with the Government of Ecuador and its defense ministry to address cyber defense issues in support of the country’s whole-of-government cyber strategy. In January 2021, the GDRP cyber advisor, Gustavo Santiago, arrived in Ecuador and has played a vital role in advising on national-level cyber policy, including by facilitating inter-ministerial agreements on the roles and responsibilities for cyber defense and for protecting Ecuador’s critical infrastructure, which are currently under review for approval. A retired U.S. Army colonel, Gustavo has worked alongside his Ecuadorian counterparts to establish a 10-year plan to build the Ministry of Defense’s cyber capacity – an initiative that garnered the support of Ecuador’s previous and current government. Since his arrival, Gustavo has shared his expertise with the Ecuadorian defense ministry to help draft foundational documents to plan the development of its cyber capabilities. This is broken out into four areas: (1) prepare the Ecuadorian defense ministry for its assigned role under the National Cybersecurity Policy—including to protect national digital critical infrastructure; (2) increase the Ecuadorian defense ministry’s coordination with Computer Security Incident Response Teams to respond to cyber incidents and mitigate the risk of future threats; (3) enhance the Cyber Defense Command’s cyber defense capabilities; and (4) implement a cyber defense program for the Ministry of Defense in line with the national cyber posture. This partnership between the United States and Ecuador came at a critical moment when strategic competitors were seeking to exert influence in the cyber domain. Gustavo continues working to build connections and new relationships between the Government of Ecuador and other U.S. government experts that work in the cybersecurity arena. Argentina In the next few weeks, a Global Defense Reform Program cyber advisor will arrive in Buenos Aires to join the Ministry of Defense and assist the Joint Staff’s Cyber Command (Comando Conjunto de Ciberdefensa or CCCD) with identifying and addressing cyber vulnerabilities and solutions. Argentina has had a robust national cyber policy for several years, but its governmental agencies and military services have observed how cyber security and policy issues can remain within organizational silos. Like in the case of GDRP Ecuador, the GDRP Argentina cyber advisor will focus on helping the Ministry of Defense coordinate across organizational lines and ensure that the ministerial-level cyber policies and strategies of the CCCD effectively support the National Cybersecurity Strategy. The placement of the cyber advisor within the Ministry of Defense is a notable development in the U.S.-Argentina relationship, which will foster trust between the United States and Argentina and reinforce the importance of partnerships and cyber cooperation in our hemisphere. Bulgaria In Europe, the Global Defense Reform Program is augmenting support to Central and Eastern European countries seeking to defend against Russian influence and malicious cyber activity. In early September, then-GDRP advisor to Bulgaria, Rich Graham, accompanied Brigadier General Vasil Sabinski, Commander of Communication Information Systems Cybersecurity Defense Command, as an official delegate to the 140th anniversary ceremony to commemorate the creation of the Bulgarian Naval Academy. To tackle cybersecurity challenges, the military has launched a new cyber program of instruction to prepare its next generation of cyber leaders. This program will equip students with the practical and technical knowledge needed to lead an effective cybersecurity operations center, modeled to blend with the practices of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense’s Cyber Defense Center. A key component of the GDRP advisor’s work is to assist with the transformation of this Center to deliver state-of-the-art cyber support and help prepare and train the government’s workforce for future cyber challenges. Although still in the early stages, the GDRP advisor has made progress in building relationships to set the conditions for the success of the cyber partnership with Bulgaria. Former Bulgarian cyber advisor with Bulgarian Navy ensign and cybersecurity Masters student Former GDRP Bulgaria cyber advisor Rich Graham (right) attends a ceremony at the Bulgarian Naval Academy for the 140th anniversary of its founding. Graham is pictured with a Bulgarian Navy ensign who is completing her Masters in Cybersecurity at the Bulgarian Naval Academy and is a 2019 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. (Photo: Ministry of Defence of North Macedonia) North Macedonia Since becoming the 30th member of NATO in March 2020, North Macedonia is focused on developing the cyber policies, infrastructure, and capabilities necessary to be an active and ready member of the alliance. This engagement will assist North Macedonia’s defense ministry to transform cyber defense planning, develop and implement a comprehensive cyber strategy to define the roles and responsibilities of different agencies that play a role in national-level cyber efforts. North Macedonian Defense Minister signs a document “We take cybersecurity very seriously.” -North Macedonian Defense Minister Radmila Shekerinska. (Photo: NATO News) Finally, this GDRP project will focus on building North Macedonia’s expertise and capacity in the cyber domain; promote good governance; increase transparency, stability, and efficiency in cyber defense planning and coordination; and enable the North Macedonia government to operate and respond more responsibly and effectively to cyber requirements. By elevating the importance of cybersecurity at the strategic level, the United States is helping countries deter, defend against, and respond to malicious cyber activity and, ultimately, protect critical infrastructure – including election systems — for societies around the world. PM Bureau’s [Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] cyber portfolio has grown rapidly in recent years to address this demand for strategic-level planning, policy, and cybersecurity assistance with defense partners.

#### Diplomacy is vital to allied cyber policy

Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*, <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217>)//BB

Cooperation improves when threat perceptions converge and when the United States exercises thoughtful leadership. It erodes when efforts to promote convergence lapse, when tactical responses take precedence over strategic trust building, and when the United States sets aside the effort to promote cooperation. U.S. leadership is essential, as every U.S. ally faces real restraints and limits in improving cyber security on its own. The United States has an abundance of bureaucratic resources compared to its allies, but it still lacks a clear vision on how to build a collective and collaborative capacity in a domain centered on secrecy and rapid response. Leadership must be built on meaningful engagement and consultation on all these matters and an appropriate modesty about our collective capacity to meet the challenges ahead. Looking to the future of cybersecurity cooperation among the United States and its Indo- Pacific allies, it is easy to identify numerous challenges, usually arising from frictions over threat assessments, desired end-states, doctrine, language, and the different public-private sector relationships in each country. But these challenges also represent opportunities, places where concrete progress can be made and where frictions lend themselves to concerted action. Progress in working one will reinforce progress in working the others. Unity of command may be a bridge too far, near-unity of action is attainable. An achievable goal is to a place where the US and its allies can convey to an adversary that "to beat any one of us, you to have to beat all of us." China's strategy is comprehensive in nature, designed to contest what it perceives a capable, sophisticated, and belligerent cyber adversary in the United States. It begins with defining a central place for cyber in China's development process and military modernization. In the military domain, China pursues improved defenses and the opportunistic pursuit of information dominance. In the economic domain, it prioritizes reduced reliance on externally-sourced technologies and components alongside incentivizing developing countries to purchase Chinese companies' affordable cyber and surveillance products. In the political domain, domestically it pursues deep social control, while internationally it conducts political campaigns to stake its claim to the moral high ground of global governance. The further development of strategic thought about the ends and means of conflict in cyber space and with cyber tools is hostage to the vocabulary and concepts imported from other domains and not yet well tailored for the realities of cyber competition and conflict. This is 2 most evident in the use of the vocabulary and concepts of nuclear deterrence to try to elaborate a strategy to compete effectively in cyber space and reduce or otherwise manage cyber risks. In a strategy of persistent engagement below the lethal threshold, deterrence concepts have little value and the failure to prevent or adequately respond to events only erodes the perception that deterrence or compellence is possible in this arena. We've learned enough to try to set aside misleading concepts but not enough to have consensus around more useful ones. In the long-term, diplomacy is as important for cyber security as deterrence and defense. Diplomacy determines the realm of the possible for political cooperation and the realm of the necessary for global governance and a global ecosystem supporting U.S. and allied values. It is the means by which best practices are shared, norms constructed, and oversteps identified and acted upon. But the United States must refresh and renew its approaches. In doing so, it should be guided by the ambition for a much more competitive cyber diplomacy.

#### DoS should lead cyber policy

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.

### Solvency---Cyber---Allied Consensus

#### State Department assistance facilitates consensus among allies

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The State Department’s foreign service officers forward-deployed as “cyber diplomats” can strengthen consensus among allies and partners on the nature of the cyber security problem and on the need for action to address it. To do so, they should be conversant with the U.S. government’s efforts to address cyber competition and armed with information to speak authoritatively about them. The State Department has long promoted a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The key elements of that framework include: (1) affirmation that established principles of international law apply to state behavior in cyberspace;62 (2) adherence to certain non-binding norms of state behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and (3) consideration, development, and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace. Since not all states share American views on responsible behavior in cyberspace, the United States is working with partners and allies on collective attribution and imposition of consequences. These initiatives are now being complemented by the Department of Defense’s strategy of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s operational approach of persistent engagement. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officers in missions around the world need to be well-versed in these other efforts and prepared to explain them to foreign partners on a routine basis. America’s partners want to understand U.S. government strategy and policies.63 It is U.S. policy that cross-domain responses to cyber aggression should be complemented with steady and sustained activities to make networks more resilient, to defend them as far forward as practicable, and to contest the most dangerous adversaries.64 Every diplomatic engagement that includes cyber issues would be an opportunity to build support for these mutually reinforcing approaches.

### Solvency---Cyber---Ambiguity

#### DoS-led cyber initiatives solve ambiguity

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.

### Solvency---Cyber---Norms

#### State Department leadership is vital to effective norm-creation

Schaffer 4-4-2022 (Aaron, “It’s a big day at the State Department for U.S. cyberdiplomacy,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/04/its-big-day-state-department-us-cyberdiplomacy/>)//BB

“Now more than ever, I think we need to have State Department leadership in dealing with all of the many different issues and threats we’re facing in cyberspace; particularly, what we’re seeing with ransomware, but also what we’ve seen with Ukraine, or the potential of what might happen with Ukraine,” Chris Painter, the Obama administration’s top cyber diplomat, told me. Painter added that the new structure, resources and prioritization for the cyber bureau “sends a strong message to both our friends and even our adversaries that this is something we care about deeply.” (The Biden administration has requested $37 million for the bureau.) Lawmakers also want Congress to pass legislation called the Cyber Diplomacy Act. The bill, which passed the House last year, would put similar changes into law. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission also recommended a similar bureau be created. Cyber workforce The new bureau also means that the list of federal cyber officials is getting longer. Jennifer Bachus, a career diplomat who was most recently a top official at the U.S. Embassy in the Czech Republic, will lead the bureau until the Senate confirms an ambassador at large. Looking ahead The bureau will have to hit the ground running. It’ll play a key role in testy international talks about rules in cyberspace, diplomacy about 5G telecommunications equipment made by Chinese tech giant Huawei, talks about the spread of ransomware and Internet governance issues. It also comes as the U.S. government jockeys for an American candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, to lead the U.N. telecommunications agency. It’s “the most important agency you’ve never heard of, setting rules for global tech like 5G,” U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power wrote last year. The bureau has support among lawmakers and experts. Advertisement “The State Department has taken a huge step toward making cybersecurity a core priority of U.S. foreign policy,” said Rep. Jim Langevin (D-R.I.), the co-chair of the Congressional Cybersecurity Caucus. “As the threat of cyber incidents escalates in severity and frequency, we need a strong diplomatic presence on the world stage to develop and implement norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.”

### Solvency---Cyber---I-Law

#### The State Department action best demonstrates the US stance on applicability of I-Law to the cyber domain

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have officially declared their respective positions and they have polar opposite views on this core question. Moreover, Estonia, Australia, and the United States have officially articulated their positions on the applicability of international law to cyber operations yet have not weighed in on this particular issue. Gary Corn considers this range of positions “prima facie evidence of the unsettled nature of the question.”85 The United States needs to seize the diplomatic initiative and publicly articulate its stance on this issue to help influence the court of world opinion. The most explicit official U.S. statement comes from the Department of Defense general counsel: For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory. This proposition is recognized in the Department’s adoption of the “defend forward” strategy: “We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.” The Department’s commitment to defend forward including to counter foreign cyber activity targeting the United States — comports with our obligations under international law and our commitment to the rules-based international order.86 This is an area where the State Department should be leading internationally if the United States hopes to persuade others to adopt its preferred norms, particularly as allies wrestle with legal ambiguities surrounding cyber operations.87

### Solvency---Cyber---AT DoD Key

#### New DoS-led cyber initiatives make existing DoD cyber efforts more effective. That solves.

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)//BB

The U.S. National Cyber Strategy’s guidance to promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, one that ensures there are consequences for irresponsible behavior, is a key objective for the United States. To succeed, this framework should be pursued in tandem with an active approach to stem ongoing adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict. The Department of Defense is now defending forward, outside its existing networks, to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. It is time for the State Department to join in these efforts. An informal division of labor currently exists between the departments of State and Defense, whereby the former promotes norms in traditional diplomatic channels while the latter pursues defend forward through military channels. Yet this leaves several problems unresolved. Parallel communication increases the risk of messaging fratricide across military and diplomatic channels in partner nations. Military cyber operations may engage foreign policy sensitivities that the State Department is better equipped to address. On the other hand, State Department desk officers may throw a wrench into planning because they do not understand Defense Department strategy. The United States needs to operate continuously alongside allies and partners. Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations by working through diplomatic channels to set the conditions for the United States to operate by, with, and through foreign partners and their networks in order to expose, contest, and defend against adversary cyber aggression. Sustained diplomacy can help institutionalize these operational partnerships and make defend forward more anticipatory and effective. Institutionalized cooperation, including the conduct of joint and coalition operations and the development of agreed-upon legal and policy frameworks, is essential to prevail in long-term strategic competition. The State Department can set the conditions for consensual foreign partner-enabled discovery operations (i.e., “hunt forward” operations) through bilateral engagements.68 These operations enable the United States and its partners to understand an adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will in turn enable network defense of U.S. partners, improve anticipatory resilience of U.S. and partner networks, and thwart cyberspace aggression. The State Department can scale the process of explaining the Defense Department’s defend forward strategy, enabling the United States to proactively set the conditions for “hunt forward” operations. The State Department can also actively ensure Defense Department cyber teams receive support from U.S. embassy country teams and benefit from insights about foreign partner networks gained through State and USAID-led cyber security capacity-building programs.

## SOLVENCY---AI

### Solvency---AI

#### State Department should be the central hub for all AI foreign policy

Dukeman 20, senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies. He previously helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics (Ryan, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/)//BB

The State Department Should Lead on AI

Why is diplomacy — rather than defense or industrial policy — the right venue for advancing a digital democracy agenda, or something like it? Simply put, the multidimensional and transnational nature of AI requires an integrated, strategic approach, and diplomats are uniquely skilled in making policy across these issues more than the sum of their piecemeal parts. To channel former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, AI is too important to be left to the generals — or the technologists — alone. So far, most of the government’s focus on AI has been through research and development investments at the Defense Department, or through White House Office of Science and Technology Policy efforts to capitalize on it as an innovative economic windfall. Unfortunately, this approach — including leaving much of the intergovernmental norm-setting on AI to peer-to-peer military discussions — misses the strategic forest for the tactical trees. Issue-specific approaches that target global AI only as a military tool or an economic boon have two dangerous flaws: They largely ignore AI as a human rights issue, and forsake the potential for alliances and issue-linkage across policy areas. For example, existing efforts have failed to leverage U.S. technological leadership to advance global norms aligned with Western values, or to use foreign assistance to promote inclusive digital development at scale. The State Department’s diplomats maintain a comparative advantage over interagency peers in remedying exactly these flaws. Diplomats are skilled in dealing with crosscutting global problems, and well suited to play a leading, orchestrating role in advancing a concerted American vision for AI across its economic, security, and human rights aspects. In Washington, at their posts, and in multilateral organizations, diplomats spend much of their days integrating peer agencies’ competing perspectives to advance a concerted U.S. agenda; leveraging instruments of national power such as foreign aid, military assistance, or visa regulations to advance disparate goals across different issues; and negotiating in bilateral and multilateral fora on economic, political, human rights, and military matters. The State Department’s sustained leadership in international organizations, which will play a major role in digital technology governance, is an additional underutilized advantage. The White House is wrong not to include the State Department as a “key agency” in its strategy on AI. In fact, the department may be the keystone agency — linking disparate, issue-specific efforts together so the result is more than the sum of its parts.

#### State Department leadership on AI solves before it can outpace restriction

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy)//BB

Reaffirming the foundations of American diplomacy is necessary but not sufficient to make it effective for a new and demanding era. The State Department will also have to adapt in ways it never before has, making sure that it is positioned to tackle the consequential tests of tomorrow and not just the policy fads of today. It can begin by taking a cue from the U.S. military’s introspective bent. The Pentagon has long embraced the value of case studies and after-action reports, and it has formalized a culture of professional education. Career diplomats, by contrast, have tended to pride themselves more on their ability to adjust quickly to shifting circumstances than on paying systematic attention to lessons learned and long-term thinking. As part of a post-Trump reinvention of diplomacy, then, the State Department ought to place a new emphasis on the craft, rediscovering diplomatic history, sharpening negotiation skills, and making the lessons of negotiations—both successful and unsuccessful—accessible to practitioners. That means fully realizing the potential of new initiatives such as the Foreign Service Institute’s Center for the Study of the Conduct of Diplomacy, where diplomats examine recent case studies. The U.S. government will also have to update its diplomatic capacity when it comes to the issues that matter to twenty-first-century foreign policy—particularly technology, economics, energy, and the climate. My generation and its predecessor had plenty of specialists in nuclear arms control and conventional energy issues; missile throw-weights and oil-pricing mechanisms were not alien concepts. During my last few years in government, however, I spent too much time sitting in meetings on the seventh floor of the State Department and in the White House Situation Room with smart, dedicated colleagues, all of us collectively faking it on the intricacies of cyberwarfare or the geopolitics of data. The pace of advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and synthetic biology will only increase in the years ahead, outstripping the ability of states and societies to devise ways to maximize their benefits, minimize their downsides, and create workable international rules of the road. To address these threats, the State Department will have to take the lead—just as it did during the nuclear age—building legal and normative frameworks and ensuring that every new officer is versed in these complex issues.

#### The State Department plays a crucial role in AI development and deployment

Shrestha 21 (Madhav, “Artificial intelligence: Strategic tool in diplomacy,” The Himalayan, <https://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/artificial-intelligence-strategic-tool-in-diplomacy)//BB>

Extensive research is being made in the developed world to create humanised artificial intelligence empowered with understanding, feelings, empathy and sympathy for diplomatic performance and to equip AI with trust, confidence and credibility. AI will also be enabled to recognise time and space and learn the necessary tacts. There is a need for the AI triad of data, talent (to develop algorithms) and computing power even to negotiate and represent national interest. Researchers describe the current times as the "AI spring" as the "AI winter" of the last century has already passed.It is well known that the U.S. government had approved the "National Artificial Intelligence Act 2020" to promote AI and advance all its essential constituents encompassing social, financial, environmental and public welfare. The State Department, which plays a crucial role in AI development and deployment, has provided policy guidance to implement trustworthy AI programmes through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) AI Policy Observatory, a forum established in February 2021.

### Solvency---AI Wars

#### State Department-led assistance solves AI rules-for-engagement and escalation

Blinken 21, US Secretary of State (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit,” <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligences-nscai-global-emerging-technology-summit/)//BB>

We’re moving quickly, because we want to ensure that as AI and related technologies transform how we live, how we work, how we compete, how we defend ourselves, that we’re staying ahead of change, indeed that we are shaping change and, critically, making sure it delivers for our people. My colleagues, I think, have very capably covered the administration’s work on these issues as it relates to our domestic renewal, our economy, and our defense. So what I’d like to do today is to focus on the State Department’s distinct role, because diplomacy will be critical. Working with partners and allies to develop and deploy technology is going to help us tackle the most urgent challenges we face, from pandemics to the climate crisis. Diplomacy will also be essential to mitigating risks, from preventing cyber attacks that target our businesses, to regulating technology that threatens our privacy, to defending our democratic values and way of life. And let me just pause for a second on that last point, because I think it deserves emphasis. It’s fundamentally what’s at stake here. More than anything else, our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our interests and upholds our democratic values. It’s not enough to highlight the horrors of techno-authoritarianism, to point to what countries like China and Russia are doing, and say that it’s wrong and dangerous, even as it is. We’ve also got to make the positive case for our own approach, and then we’ve got to deliver. That is the challenge before us. We need the United States and we need its partners to remain the world’s innovative leaders and standard setters, to ensure that universal rights and democratic values remain at the center of all the innovation that’s to come, and that it delivers real benefits in people’s lives. That fundamentally is the test that we have to pass, and it’s a test I think you’ve heard President Biden allude to. In short, democracies have to pass the tech test together. And diplomacy, I believe, has a big role to play in that. Now, any time you hear someone from the State Department talking, we’re likely to throw in pillars and frameworks and tranches, so I can’t be any different today. We have to have our pillars, so let me walk you through six of them – (laughter) – that cover the approach to these issues. I know you’d be disappointed without it. The first is reducing the national security risks posed by malicious cyber activities and emerging technologies. This is the most basic thing our diplomacy has to do: protect our people, protect our networks, prevent conflict, and establish standards of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Already, we’ve brought countries together around an approach that recognizes international law to make it clear that countries are governed in cyberspace just like they are offline and that defines norms that apply not only in wartime but in peacetime too, because we’re now dealing with significant cyber incidents outside the context of war. We’ve also called for practical confidence-building measures; for example, steps as simple as establishing points of contact, so that in the event of a major cyber incident we actually know who to call. Under American leadership, UN member-states have come together repeatedly to reaffirm this basic framework. Now we’re working to bring allies and partners along to respond collectively when others engage in malicious cyber activity. That’s what happened after the SolarWinds intrusion. We attributed it to Russia; 22 countries, the European Union, NATO quickly supported that conclusion. And that’s important, because when we speak with one voice, we can more effectively deter future bad acts. Last month, as some of you will have noted, at the NATO summit, NATO reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article V – “an attack on one is an attack on all” – and that’s an important step too in deterring those attacks and protecting our national security in the cyber age. We’re also treating ransomware not only as a law enforcement issue but also as a national security issue. Ransomware and other cyber crimes affect all of us – our businesses, local governments; our most critical infrastructure, from power grids to hospitals. As you know, one in four Americans has been the victim of a cyber crime, at a cost of more than $4 billion every single year. That’s a direct threat to the safety, to the well-being of our people, and so it’s at the top of our diplomatic agenda. And it’s also why we’re elevating ransomware in our engagements with Russia. Our message is clear: Countries that harbor cyber criminals have a responsibility to take action. If they don’t, we will. We’re strengthening our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to fight transnational cyber criminals, and we’re working to expand membership in the global cyber crime treaty known as the Budapest Convention. We’ll launch similar efforts on AI and other emerging technologies. If they’re going to be used as part of our national defense, we want the world to have a shared understanding of how to do that responsibly, in the same way that we’ve hammered out rules for how to use conventional and nuclear weapons. That’s how we reduce the risk of proliferation. It’s how we prevent escalation or unintended incidents.

### Solvency---Military Bad---Private Involvement

#### Military-based AI cooperation fails. Public opposition and major private firms will refuse to cooperation.

Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House (Erik, “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.2)//BB

Tepid public support at home and abroad can stymie alliance military operations in two ways. First, public opposition to the use of AI among allied populations may lead policymakers to restrict the use of AI-enabled technologies for military operations. In the event of future hostilities, for example, the South Korean or German governments might oppose an ally’s use of AI-enabled lethal weapon systems on their territory.60 Indeed, advocacy from the public and activist groups has led a growing number of states — including U.S. allies like Pakistan and Jordan — to call for bans on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems.61 Second, civilian engineers and researchers that develop AI technology may refuse to work on military AI contracts. Disruptions to AI development can hinder the fielding of new capabilities and generate mistrust between the government and civilian firms. Google employees, for instance, protested their involvement in Project Maven, a Defense Department program that uses AI to analyze video collected by military drones.62 In a letter to their CEO, the employees argued that “Google should not be in the business of war,” explaining that the company should not “outsource the moral responsibility of [its] technologies to third parties,” and that work on Defense Department-backed AI would “irreparably damage Google’s brand.”63 The resistance ultimately led Google to terminate its involvement in the contract and generated public criticism of the Defense Department’s AI efforts.64

## SOLVENCY---BIOTECH

### Solvency---Biotech

#### State Department leadership on advanced biotech solves

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy)//BB

Reaffirming the foundations of American diplomacy is necessary but not sufficient to make it effective for a new and demanding era. The State Department will also have to adapt in ways it never before has, making sure that it is positioned to tackle the consequential tests of tomorrow and not just the policy fads of today. It can begin by taking a cue from the U.S. military’s introspective bent. The Pentagon has long embraced the value of case studies and after-action reports, and it has formalized a culture of professional education. Career diplomats, by contrast, have tended to pride themselves more on their ability to adjust quickly to shifting circumstances than on paying systematic attention to lessons learned and long-term thinking. As part of a post-Trump reinvention of diplomacy, then, the State Department ought to place a new emphasis on the craft, rediscovering diplomatic history, sharpening negotiation skills, and making the lessons of negotiations—both successful and unsuccessful—accessible to practitioners. That means fully realizing the potential of new initiatives such as the Foreign Service Institute’s Center for the Study of the Conduct of Diplomacy, where diplomats examine recent case studies. The U.S. government will also have to update its diplomatic capacity when it comes to the issues that matter to twenty-first-century foreign policy—particularly technology, economics, energy, and the climate. My generation and its predecessor had plenty of specialists in nuclear arms control and conventional energy issues; missile throw-weights and oil-pricing mechanisms were not alien concepts. During my last few years in government, however, I spent too much time sitting in meetings on the seventh floor of the State Department and in the White House Situation Room with smart, dedicated colleagues, all of us collectively faking it on the intricacies of cyberwarfare or the geopolitics of data. The pace of advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and synthetic biology will only increase in the years ahead, outstripping the ability of states and societies to devise ways to maximize their benefits, minimize their downsides, and create workable international rules of the road. To address these threats, the State Department will have to take the lead—just as it did during the nuclear age—building legal and normative frameworks and ensuring that every new officer is versed in these complex issues.

### Solvency---Biotech---Expertise

#### The State Department has the expertise and leadership to promote biotech diplomacy

Bade 22, tech and policy analyst @ Eurasia Group (Scott, “Digital diplomacy gets a reboot,” Tech Crunch, <https://techcrunch.com/2022/04/08/digital-diplomacy-gets-a-reboot/>)//BB

CDP [Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy] will have three policy buckets: international cyber security, digital policy and digital freedom. Each roughly corresponds to preexisting competencies: the cyber coordinator office (created back in 2011), the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, respectively. It will be run by a yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador-at-large; in the meantime, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus will run the team as principal deputy assistant secretary. While the new bureau will deal with the day-to-day, a separate special envoy position will also be created to focus on more long-term issues around emerging and critical technologies like AI, quantum and biotechnology. Missing in action no more? The “decision to stand up a new bureau is an indicator of how seriously [the Biden administration] sees these threats,” Eileen Donahoe, a former U.S. ambassador who now runs the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, tells me. “They understand the need for more thought leadership and diplomatic capacity.” One sign of that seriousness is that both offices will, for at least a year, report directly to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the department’s number two official. This is a good thing, says Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration’s top diplomat on cyber issues. Sherman, he says, has a long history with cyber issues and worked to integrate technology issues at regional bureaus she ran earlier in her career. CDP will need that high-level support. The State Department is playing catch up, I’m told, and attempting to bring its expertise — diplomacy and knowledge of international relations — to more technical policymakers at the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and other agencies. The implication is clear: State’s voice has been missing in the interagency process and opportunities have been missed both at home and abroad. For example, as Nate Picarsic and Emily de la Bruyère have written, the U.S. has been largely absent from the politics of the intergovernmental organizations that are quietly setting the global standards of technology. As a result the U.S. has ceded ground to others, especially Russia and China, but even the European Union, with massive implications for who controls the future of technology. And as new international entities emerge, like the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council or the Quad’s technology working group, the State Department needs to be able to coordinate and advise. Under the Trump administration, you “had good, talented people,” working these issues, Painter tells me, “but no one at the leadership level [able] both to deal with the White House and senior counterparts and foreign counterparts. [The new bureau] helps fill that gap.” “This is a real down payment by the department,” says Yll Bajraktari, a former national security official who is now the CEO of Special Competitive Studies Project, an AI advocacy group. “Integrating the department’s capacity for cybersecurity, digital infrastructure and governance issues including internet freedom will help create a coherent diplomatic strategy.”

### Solvency---Biotech---Norms/Cooperation

#### State Department leadership solves biosecurity norms and cooperation

Jenkins 22, US Ambassador, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Denise, “Priorities Regarding the New and Emerging Challenges to International Security,” Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/priorities-regarding-the-new-and-emerging-challenges-to-international-security/>)

Last Spring, Secretary Blinken set out the Biden-Harris Administration’s vision of a foreign policy that leads with diplomacy, revitalizes our global network of alliances to meet emerging global challenges, and delivers for the American people. It is a vison, as the Secretary noted, that springs from two fundamental principles: that American leadership and engagement matters, and those countries need to engage and cooperate, now more than ever. It is the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation. Today, I am happy to be here to present my priorities as Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security; known inside of the State Department as ‘T.’ The ideas I list today are in light of the many changes that we see in the international security landscape. I chose today to present my priorities, just as we mark the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972. To me, it is a humbling reminder that even as we face monumental international security challenges today, our predecessors prevailed through the power of diplomacy. In everything we do, we will look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength. I should note that while I am presenting these ideas, adjustments will be made as we continue to better understand the changes that are taking place and the security environment around us settles. Little did we know last year at the beginning of the Biden Administration that Putin would invade Ukraine. Things are continuing to change on a large scale. Some of today’s arms control and international security landscape remains the same, such as the DPRK’s insistence on advancing its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and refusing to engage in diplomacy. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still the most viable option to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, remains unclear. We remain strongly committed to our efforts regarding both the DPRK and the JCPOA. In the meantime, there are other changes – like Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and the growing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that present us with many more questions than answers. Now is the time to consider a new way to address what are new challenges. Russia’s unprovoked invasion has led us to consider what gaps now exist. What does the new landscape mean for us and the issues within T such as arms control, deterrence, nonproliferation, security assistance, and emerging technologies? The People’s Republic of China is also posing new challenges in many areas of our responsibility. How do we address those challenges? Technology is advancing, as are the opportunities and challenges posed by an increased interest in space, while at the same time, climate change and resource limitations can lead to conflict if not addressed. We need to focus on the headlines of today, while keeping an eye on the trendlines for the challenges to come. The T Family is comprised of three Bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is my honor to lead these Bureaus and work closely with their leadership to use our diplomatic engagements and programs and when needed, sanctions and other pressure, working with the interagency, to implement these priorities of mine. Let me give you a preview. I have nine priorities. They are as follows: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective Protect and promote the U.S. and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages Promote, protect, and advance the U.S. Civil – Nuclear Industry Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships Building the “T Family Brain Trust” to Address New and Emerging Challenges to International Security Examine “New” Areas of Conflict in International Security Strengthen and Amplify the T Bureaus The three T Bureaus are developing or will develop a way forward on these priorities, including new priorities I have asked them to incorporate. While these are my priorities, I note that all of the work of the Bureaus are important to the U.S. and to international security. Priority One: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities The T Family will continue to engage the international community in strengthening existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes, and related activities, including in light of recent challenges to those regimes. This includes, where possible, meaningful engagements and dialogues with Russia and the People’s Republic of China. I have worked in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament for 30 years and I can say that arms control remains as important today as it ever was. While there have certainly been challenges to and violations of international arms control agreements by a handful of countries, arms control is not dead as some would like you to believe. Arms control remains an important means to increase allied and global security by reducing risk and enhancing stability. The importance of arms control will also grow as we face competitors pursuing reckless and destabilizing buildups of their nuclear forces combined with opaque, nontransparent nuclear use doctrines. However, progress can only be made in a situation of de-escalation, not escalation. In all cases, we need willing partners sitting across and around the table. We remain committed to the implementation of New START and eventually getting back to the table to continue the dialogue on laying the groundwork for future arms control and to the pursuit of follow-on measures to the New START treaty. As you know, following Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, we have suspended our Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD). That said, the issues that have been laid out prior to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are even more important now. In that respect, we want to sustain limits on the Russian systems covered under New START beyond 2026, limit the new kinds of nuclear weapons Russia has fielded or is developing, and address all nuclear weapons including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. We must also be flexible as we consider the ways in which we pursue risk reduction and future arms control measures. We will be looking at the different types of forms these efforts can take, including but not be limited to a traditional approach of focusing on negotiating treaties. The way forward in this new international security landscape may be in the form of initiatives like the U.S. voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing recently announced by Vice President Harris, or codes of conduct, or best practices. We can see from the current crisis that the security environment remains complex and is becoming more complex. There is no single, elegant solution to managing nuclear or other 21st century risks. The U.S. is prepared to be creative in finding ways forward and partnering with others to make the world safer. That is what being a leader in arms control is about. On nuclear disarmament, we remain committed to a world without nuclear weapons in the context of enhancing international security overall. While our concerns about the ability of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to achieve its goals have not changed, we remain committed to engaging in pragmatic efforts to pursue effective measures related to nuclear disarmament. This includes work conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), with whom we work closely. We support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will work to achieve its entry force while maintaining our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to seek negotiations on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call on all relevant countries to join us in declaring and maintaining a moratorium on such production. We will also continue to work with our P5 colleagues, circumstances permitting, to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its three pillars. The U.S. assumes coordination of the P5 Process in June, and we hope to build on previous efforts. The recent P5 statement on the prevention of nuclear war is a good example of the important work we can do together; we must hold each other to those commitments. We will put renewed focus on these efforts and now that travel restrictions have lifted, we are looking at when we can meet face to face with partners in these forums and discuss ways to move ahead, especially taking into account how the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine has impacted the landscape of that work. Indeed, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling only underscores the importance of preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Our Bureaus will also continue to lead efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government by partnering with the interagency, academia, the scientific community, non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others. There are other new challenges that require continued attention. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly building up a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal. The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the estimated size that the United States projected just two years ago in 2020. As I noted in my speech last year at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Conference, and it remains true to this day, the U.S. continues to request that the PRC be more transparent about the purpose and direction of its nuclear strategy. There is currently no formal dialogue between our governments on this subject, and limited tools are available to mitigate risk and prevent crisis escalation with the PRC. We will continue to seek engagement with appropriate PRC officials on risk reduction. As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, or NPT RevCon, will at long last take place in August in New York. With the Russian government’s reckless and destabilizing rhetoric, it is more important now than ever for all States Parties to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and recommit to its goals. The August NPT RevCon provides an opportunity to do that. While the U.S. recognizes the challenges that Russia’s actions pose to the NPT, we will emphasize practical actions responsible nuclear powers can take to reduce nuclear risks and pursue a realistic path on arms control and disarmament, and to ensure that all NPT Parties can realize its full benefits. The RevCon presents an opportunity to reflect both on how much has been accomplished and on what can and must be done to preserve and extend that progress. The NPT remains instrumental in limiting the risk of nuclear war by avoiding a cascade of nuclear proliferation and laying the groundwork for progress on disarmament. The U.S. will use the Review Conference to promote its objectives in all three of the NPT’s pillars – the areas of nonproliferation and strengthened safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. We plan to find areas of common ground on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and a positive dialogue among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The U.S. is also committed to the third pillar of the NPT – the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. In that respect, the U.S. and the UK have co-led an effort to build a multilateral deliverable, called the “Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses,” to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The Sustained Dialogue aims to integrate non-traditional stakeholders in the NPT process to promote broader acceptance of peaceful uses as a solution to development challenges and to create a lasting framework that better captures peaceful use assistance as a dividend of the NPT. It provides a benefit of the NPT that often gets overshadowed by political debates on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Here, I want to thank my colleagues, Ambassador Adam Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, for his leadership as we prepare for the NPT Review Conference, and for the work that former Assistant Secretary Tom Countryman has accomplished since he agreed to return to us and assist in this process. We also see the Review Conference as an opportunity to recognize the continued need for a strong International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its work on safeguards, safety, and security. The IAEA has been doing significant work in the area of peaceful uses as well as in other areas of concern, including convening the recent first Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, its work on cybersecurity, on nuclear law, and in other areas. Strong U.S. leadership on nonproliferation will also involve continuing to promote the combination of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto international standard for verifying that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the AP, and so now is the time to reinvigorate our efforts in support of its universal adoption. We will also reiterate our support for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and for all states to halt production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Moving on to the other important areas in priority one, there is a renewed focus on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As I noted at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva last year, for the past two decades, efforts to strengthen the Convention have been treading water. States Parties have been unable to agree to significant action. We face a biological weapons threat that is real and, in many respects, growing. Some states continue to possess sophisticated, well-established biological weapons programs, while non-state actors have shown continuing interest in acquiring biological weapons capabilities. Additionally, the widespread availability of sophisticated scientific and technological tools and methods is gradually eroding barriers to the development of biological weapons. COVID-19 is a wake-up call for all of us. The astonishing human toll of the pandemic has illustrated our shared vulnerability to novel pathogens. In Geneva, I noted a two-pronged approach. The Review Conference should take near-term, concrete action to strengthen the Convention and benefit States Parties. These actions include further operationalizing assistance under Article VII; establishing a voluntary fund for technical cooperation; creating a mechanism to review advances in science and technology; deepening collaborations on biosafety and biosecurity; staffing the Implementation Support Unit to carry out these roles; and enabling more agile decision making. The second way forward is for the Review Conference to take steps to address the harder issues. It should establish a new expert working group to examine possible measures to strengthen implementation of the Convention, increase transparency, and enhance assurance of compliance. I was very happy this year to appoint a new BWC Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to lead the government’s engagements on the BWC. I am pleased that the States Parties reached consensus to delay the Review Conference until November, which allows time for the newly nominated RevCon President to prepare for the meeting. Our Special Representative Ken Ward will spend the next few months working closely with allies and like-minded countries as we turn our broad concepts into specific proposals. Along with this effort is work by my team to enhance biosafety and biosecurity norms, practices, tools, and resources to bolster cooperation in forums such as the BWC, Global Partnership, and the Global Health Security Agenda. We will work to ensure the tools needed to address these challenges have the attention and resources needed to confront biological challenges. We will work to build national capacity to mitigate biological threats. Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC, the United States is on track to complete destruction of its chemical weapons by September 2023, and we have destroyed over 97 percent of our fully declared stockpile. Given the potential chemical weapons threat to Ukraine, the United States is again leading and working closely with allies and partners. I am proud of the bilateral security assistance that the United States has provided to Ukraine, including over $100 million in life-saving protective and detection equipment and related medical countermeasures, in addition to funds provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that will be used to assist Ukraine to protect against the threat of chemical weapons. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance is also continuing to work with the OPCW to hold Russia and Syria accountable for their past chemical weapons use and to deter further use. We look forward to additional OPCW reports this summer from its Investigation and Identification Team that will identify those responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The Bureau will continue to make advances in chemical forensics to improve the ability of the United States, allies, partners, and the OPCW to attribute the use of chemical weapons. The CWC States Parties Review Conference in 2023 is another opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the CWC and its implementation. We are now considering our goals for the Review Conference to advance its work. In all our work, we will continue to combat disinformation against U.S. activities and engagements. The U.S. has been a leader in the development of conventional arms control instruments, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, we continue to see a role for conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. This kind of arms control can enhance mutual confidence and transparency among states and reduce the risk of conflict. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance continues to support full compliance with existing conventional arms control agreements and the development of new ideas for future confidence- and security-building mechanisms, including the modernization of the Vienna Document to reflect the new political-military realities in Europe. It is important to have a base of existing conventional arms control instruments that we can build on to restore a more enduring peace. Moving on to fortifying related activities as I also noted in this priority, we will enhance the role of export controls and counter proliferation measures in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, and related technologies. The multilateral export control regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group – remain important bodies through which we work with our allies and partners to address proliferation challenges. The regimes protect nonproliferation imperatives while providing predictability for exporters and are the basis for preventing advanced technologies from falling into adversarial competitors. These regimes and institutions must adjust to the challenges in the international security landscape. We will enhance U.S. leadership in these regimes and institutions and advance novel approaches to the challenges each regime face. We will also support the important work of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s programmatic offices that promote adherence to the regimes’ guidance and updates to the control lists among non-member countries, thereby expanding the reach of nonproliferation norms. In that respect, I commend you to go online and learn more about the extensive programmatic work of the T Bureaus.

## AFFIRMATIVE

### Perm Do Both

#### Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” *Air War College*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

#### Close collaboration is good

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD’s close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized – bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

### Perm Do CP

#### Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

#### State controls security cooperation – all DOD SC is carried out through embassies under direct supervision of State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Who Conducts Security Cooperation

The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and

managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic / National Level

The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15

Operational and Tactical Level

The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs,

administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives

to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility.

Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the

GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and

activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan

assessments.16

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in a country. The President gives the Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927).17 The Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) within the Country Team. The SCO includes all DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA and SC management functions under titles 22 and 10 USC. SCOs typically include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.18

#### Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

### No Solvency---Top-Shelf

#### The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

### No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

#### Benghazi created excessive risk aversion

Hartig 21, Executive Editor of Just Security. He is also Executive Director of National Journal's Network Science Initiative and Fellow, International Security Program at New America. Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council, former Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Luke, “Letting Diplomacy Lead US Counterterrorism: What Would That Look Like?,” Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/75046/letting-diplomacy-lead-us-counterterrorism-what-would-that-look-like/)//BB>

But State Department management – and the broader U.S. government leadership – has at times struggled with how to effectively manage risk. Much of this is because of the highly politicized environment the department found itself in after the September 2012 Benghazi attack in Libya. To be sure, Benghazi exposed shortcomings, particularly in how the State Department’s security professionals plugged into policy discussions. But it also spurred much-needed changes to how the department trains its personnel and evaluates risks overseas. Yet, as Republicans used the attacks to launch escalating political attacks, the U.S. government seemed to retreat into a bunker mentality.

#### That, combined with understaffing, decimates solvency

David, Acosta and Krohley 21, Colonel Arnel P. David is a US Army strategist assigned to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. First Sergeant Sean A. Acosta is a civil affairs noncommissioned officer, and was the US Army’s 2018 NCO of the year. Dr. Nicholas Krohley is the principal of FrontLine Advisory. (“GETTING COMPETITION WRONG: THE US MILITARY’S LOOMING FAILURE,” *Modern War Institute*, <https://mwi.usma.edu/getting-competition-wrong-the-us-militarys-looming-failure/>)//BB

At present, we are engaged in global competition with China (and, to a much lesser extent, Russia). We are engaged in a regional contest with Iran. Global jihadist networks remain a potent threat. That said, we do ourselves a devastating disservice when we approach the rest of the world on the basis of its utility in these contests. American policy in Ukraine is downstream of our rivalry with Russia. The same is true for our engagement in Iraq with respect to Iran, and across much of the Global South vis-à-vis China. We instrumentalize bilateral relationships with smaller powers in pursuit of advantage against our rivals, while neglecting the local details that define the strategic landscape. This instrumentalization is readily apparent to those on the receiving end, provoking cynicism and frustration from Kyiv to Baghdad and beyond. Ultimately, it is exploitative and self-defeating—just as it was during the Cold War, when this same mentality led us to disaster from Vietnam to Nicaragua. The new great game will be won or lost based, above all else, on contextual understanding, partnerships, and alliances. It is not America’s responsibility to solve intractable problems in distant lands. However, we absolutely must understand said problems (as we have demonstrably failed to do over the past twenty years), so that we might manage our entanglements and the expenditure of finite resources. Across much of the globe, this task falls to the US military. The Department of State is understaffed, and isolated from ground truth by crippling risk aversion. The intelligence community’s priorities lie elsewhere. From sub-Saharan Africa to the South China Sea, the military is often our principal point of contact with contested terrain.

#### The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA493001.pdf>)//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

### No Solvency---Political Backlash

#### Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev 20, Executive Director @ WIDA, The Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA) is an independent organization that provides practical professional training in diplomacy and international affairs — both in person and online — to students, recent graduates and professionals in government, NGOs and the private sector (Nicholas, “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,” Washington International Diplomatic Academy, <https://diplomaticacademy.us/2020/06/14/kralev-why-politicians-dont-trust-diplomats/)//BB>

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

### No Solvency---Trust

#### Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

#### The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

#### Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/>)//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

### No Solvency---AT Bergmann

#### State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

#### Even Bergmann admits structural reforms in the DoS would be necessary for solvency

1NC Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is “not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy” security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department’s lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.

### AT HR Solvency Deficit

#### The Department of Defense uses Security Cooperation to protect and promote human rights

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense diplomacy role the Department’s representatives in embassies play, ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our national security interests and values. What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, humanitarian affairs, and rule of law—including our civilian oversight of the military—is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet their goals and advance those shared values. Doing so is both a moral and strategic imperative. We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners’ efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged the offices of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, Peace and Security; civilian protection; and respect for the rule of law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into crises that spill outside the country’s borders.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Non-Unique

#### The military already controls the vast majority of US foreign policy

Quainton 17, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University (Anthony, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2018/03/militarization-and-marginalization-of-american-diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/)//BB>

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Military Solves

#### Military diplomacy promotes soft power

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Since military people know better than anyone the true cost of waging war, the U.S. military has a vested interest in working to build capabilities and partnerships to maintain worldwide peace and stability. Although the lines between what are doctrinally military or diplomatic missions may blur, it is to the advantage of both the State Department and the military to capitalize on any opportunity to advance the policy and security of the United States. The military, known as a hard-power tool, can also be used as a soft-power one. Military members serving overseas in any capacity are already often the forefront of American diplomacy, moving their mission set beyond traditional warfighting to an extended role in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States, with great success. The fact that China is increasingly involved in regions like Africa and Latin America—giving Beijing influence there—is further reason for the United States to take a more active approach and mitigate vulnerabilities. China has learned from our greatest strategic achievement, the Marshall Plan, and has formulated a long-term strategy to, among other things, undermine U.S. influence. We need a coordinated, long-term plan of military diplomacy and economic support in response.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good

#### Military-first should be the objective for all security assistance

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

#### Militarized foreign policy leads to global peace

Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/11/security-cooperation-a-key-pillar-of-defense-policy/)//>BB

As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117. This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.[4] The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States. Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”[5] U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.

#### Militarized foreign policy solves a variety of non-military threats

Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/11/security-cooperation-a-key-pillar-of-defense-policy/)//>BB

The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are: Obtaining base access as a quid pro quo Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g., participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil–military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.

### AT Democracy Impact

#### Democracy’s net less peaceful---they have no advantage over autocracies but have a propensity to go to war with autocracies.

Bakker ’17 (Femke; is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science @ University of Leiden; *Do liberal norms matter? A cross-regime experimental investigation of the normative explanation of the democratic peace in China and the Netherlands*; [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/74424/Bakker\_2017.pdf?sequence=1](about:blank); accessed 7/21/19; MSCOTT)

Concluding discussion

Democratic peace theory posits that individuals of liberal-democracies are socialized with liberal norms that nurture a peaceful attitude towards other democracies. Furthermore, it postulates that individuals in autocracies lack this socialization process and will consequently be more war prone towards all regime-types. Previous studies into this mechanism at microlevel found that democratic individuals are indeed more peaceful towards democracies during an interstate conflict. However, these studies have focused their research on democratic individuals only, and moreover have assumed the presence of liberal norms rather than measuring these. This research extends to those studies by measuring the level of liberal norms among democratic and autocratic individuals and compare the effect these norms have on the support for war within an experimental setting.

Indeed, the democratic experimental group showed to be more peaceful towards other democracies, just like previous studies showed. However, the comparative perspective brought a new insight: because the autocratic citizens were overall more peaceful towards all regime-types the comparison showed that actually the democratic participants were not more peaceful towards other democracies, but rather more war-prone towards autocracies. These 22 findings are important in the light of theoretical refinement, and show that we cannot simply assume autocratic individuals to be war prone, as democratic peace theory does (Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett 1993, p.35, Weart 1998, pp.81-83, Rousseau 2005, pp.27-28).

Secondly, the measuring of liberal norms showed that also autocratic individuals posses a level of liberal norms. The average of the autocratic group was indeed significantly lower than the democratic group, but the difference was small and had a small effect size. Most important contribution of this measurement is that liberal norms cannot be assumed to be absent within autocracies, as democratic peace theory does. Moreover, liberal norms showed to have only an effect within the democratic group: those with a higher level of liberal norms were more inclined to attack an autocracy over a democracy. Within the autocratic group, the level of liberal norms did not have any influence on the support for war.

These results show how important it is to indeed measure liberal norms and not simply assume these to be present or absent. Furthermore, these finding raise many questions that further research might be inspired by. If these results would hold when the experiment would be replicated for different samples of democratic and autocratic individuals, in other words: if democratic individuals show in new studies also to be triggered by autocracy to become more war prone, in particular when they endorse liberal norms more highly, we might have found more evidence for the argument that Western political rhetoric has molded democratic peace theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy, as was argued by several authors (Ish-Shalom 2006, Risse-Kappen 1995, Houghton 2007, Houghton 2009).

Another important extension to earlier studies is that this research has controlled for the threat of the conflict, after all, if a threat is not perceived as severe, why would anyone want to attack any other country? The results of that test showed actually more variance than initially anticipated, in other words: it had to be considered within the analyses of the data. Because a test showed that there was no relation between the perception of threat and the treatment of regime-type, perception of threat was taken into consideration as an independent variable. And threat matters, strongly. Within a multivariate test of all theorized indicators, perception of threat shows to be the most important indicator why democratic and autocratic individuals alike support war. It was actually so strong that the effect of regime-type and liberal norms that showed in the descriptive results, was faded out.

### AT Hegemony Impact

#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.